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Abstract
Here we present in a single essay a combination and completion of the
several aspects of the problem of randomness of individual objects which of
necessity occur scattered in our text [10]. The reader can consult different
arrangements of parts of the material in [7, 20].
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1 Introduction
Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749—1827) has pointed out the following reason why
intuitively a regular outcome of a random event is unlikely.
“We arrange in our thought all possible events in various classes; and
we regard as extraordinary those classes which include a very small
number. In the game of heads and tails, if head comes up a hundred
times in a row then this appears to us extraordinary, because the
almost infinite number of combinations that can arise in a hundred
throws are divided in regular sequences, or those in which we ob-
serve a rule that is easy to grasp, and in irregular sequences, that
are incomparably more numerous”. [P.S. Laplace, A Philosophical
Essay on Probabilities,, Dover, 1952. Originally published in 1819.
Translated from 6th French edition. Pages 16-17.]
If by ‘regularity’ we mean that the complexity is significantly less than maximal,
then the number of all regular events is small (because by simple counting the
number of different objects of low complexity is small). Therefore, the event
that anyone of them occurs has small probability (in the uniform distribution).
Yet, the classical calculus of probabilities tells us that 100 heads are just as
probable as any other sequence of heads and tails, even though our intuition
tells us that it is less ‘random’ than some others. Listen to the redoubtable Dr.
Samuel Johnson (1709—1784):
“Dr. Beattie observed, as something remarkable which had hap-
pened to him, that he chanced to see both the No. 1 and the No.
1000, of the hackney-coaches, the first and the last; ‘Why, Sir’, said
Johnson, ‘there is an equal chance for one’s seeing those two num-
bers as any other two.’ He was clearly right; yet the seeing of two
extremes, each of which is in some degree more conspicuous than the
rest, could not but strike one in a stronger manner than the sight
of any other two numbers.” [James Boswell (1740—1795), Life of
Johnson, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1970. (Edited by
R.W. Chapman, 1904 Oxford edition, as corrected by J.D. Fleeman,
third edition. Originally published in 1791.) Pages 1319-1320.]
Laplace distinguishes between the object itself and a cause of the object.
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“The regular combinations occur more rarely only because they are
less numerous. If we seek a cause wherever we perceive symmetry, it
is not that we regard the symmetrical event as less possible than the
others, but, since this event ought to be the effect of a regular cause
or that of chance, the first of these suppositions is more probable
than the second. On a table we see letters arranged in this order C
o n s t a n t i n o p l e, and we judge that this arrangement
is not the result of chance, not because it is less possible than others,
for if this word were not employed in any language we would not
suspect it came from any particular cause, but this word being in
use among us, it is incomparably more probable that some person
has thus arranged the aforesaid letters than that this arrangement
is due to chance.” [P.S. Laplace, Ibid.]
Let us try to turn Laplace’s argument into a formal one. First we introduce
some notation. If x is a finite binary sequence, then l(x) denotes the length
(number of occurrences of binary digits) in x. For example, l(010) = 3.
1.1 Occam’s Razor Revisited
Suppose we observe a binary string x of length l(x) = n and want to know
whether we must attribute the occurrence of x to pure chance or to a cause.
To put things in a mathematical framework, we define chance to mean that the
literal x is produced by independent tosses of a fair coin. More subtle is the
interpretation of cause as meaning that the computer on our desk computes x
from a program provided by independent tosses of a fair coin. The chance of
generating x literally is about 2−n. But the chance of generating x in the form
of a short program x∗, the cause from which our computer computes x, is at
least 2−l(x
∗). In other words, if x is regular, then l(x∗) ≪ n, and it is about
2n−l(x
∗) times more likely that x arose as the result of computation from some
simple cause (like a short program x∗) than literally by a random process.
This approach will lead to an objective and absolute version of the classic
maxim of William of Ockham (1290? – 1349?), known as Occam’s razor: “if
there are alternative explanations for a phenomenon, then, all other things being
equal, we should select the simplest one”. One identifies ‘simplicity of an object’
with ‘an object having a short effective description’. In other words, a priori
we consider objects with short descriptions more likely than objects with only
long descriptions. That is, objects with low complexity have high probability
while objects with high complexity have low probability.
This principle is intimately related with problems in both probability theory
and information theory. These problems as outlined below can be interpreted
as saying that the related disciplines are not ‘tight’ enough; they leave things
unspecified which our intuition tells us should be dealt with.
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1.2 Lacuna of Classical Probability Theory
An adversary claims to have a true random coin and invites us to bet on the
outcome. The coin produces a hundred heads in a row. We say that the coin
cannot be fair. The adversary, however, appeals to probabity theory which says
that each sequence of outcomes of a hundred coin flips is equally likely, 1/2100,
and one sequence had to come up.
Probability theory gives us no basis to challenge an outcome after it has
happened. We could only exclude unfairness in advance by putting a penalty
side-bet on an outcome of 100 heads. But what about 1010 . . .? What about
an initial segment of the binary expansion of π?
Regular sequence
Pr(00000000000000000000000000) =
1
226
Regular sequence
Pr(01000110110000010100111001) =
1
226
Random sequence
Pr(10010011011000111011010000) =
1
226
The first sequence is regular, but what is the distinction of the second se-
quence and the third? The third sequence was generated by flipping a quarter.
The second sequence is very regular: 0, 1, 00, 01, . . .. The third sequence will
pass (pseudo-)randomness tests.
In fact, classical probability theory cannot express the notion of randomness
of an individual sequence. It can only express expectations of properties of
outcomes of random processes, that is, the expectations of properties of the
total set of sequences under some distribution.
Only relatively recently, this problem has found a satisfactory resolution by
combining notions of computability and statistics to express the complexity of
a finite object. This complexity is the length of the shortest binary program
from which the object can be effectively reconstructed. It may be called the
algorithmic information content of the object. This quantity turns out to be
an attribute of the object alone, and absolute (in the technical sense of being
recursively invariant). It is the Kolmogorov complexity of the object.
1.3 Lacuna of Information Theory
In [21], Claude Elwood Shannon (1916—2001) assigns a quantity of information
or entropy to an ensemble of possible messages. All messages in the ensemble
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being equally probable, this quantity is the number of bits needed to count all
possibilities.
This expresses the fact that each message in the ensemble can be communi-
cated using this number of bits. However, it does not say anything about the
number of bits needed to convey any individual message in the ensemble. To
illustrate this, consider the ensemble consisting of all binary strings of length
9999999999999999.
By Shannon’s measure, we require 9999999999999999 bits on the average
to encode a string in such an ensemble. However, the string consisting of
9999999999999999 1’s can be encoded in about 55 bits by expressing 9999999999
999999 in binary and adding the repeated pattern ‘1’. A requirement for this to
work is that we have agreed on an algorithm that decodes the encoded string.
We can compress the string still further when we note that 9999999999999999
equals 32 × 1111111111111111, and that 1111111111111111 consists of 24 1’s.
Thus, we have discovered an interesting phenomenon: the description of
some strings can be compressed considerably, provided they exhibit enough
regularity. This observation, of course, is the basis of all systems to express very
large numbers and was exploited early on by Archimedes (287BC—212BC) in
his treatise The Sand-Reckoner, in which he proposes a system to name very
large numbers:
“There are some, King Golon, who think that the number of sand
is infinite in multitude [...or] that no number has been named which
is great enough to exceed its multitude. [...] But I will try to show
you, by geometrical proofs, which you will be able to follow, that,
of the numbers named by me [...] some exceed not only the mass
of sand equal in magnitude to the earth filled up in the way de-
scribed, but also that of a mass equal in magnitude to the universe.”
[Archimedes, The Sand-Reckoner, pp. 420-429 in: The World of
Mathematics, Vol. 1, J.R. Newman, Ed., Simon and Schuster, New
York, 1956. Page 420.]
However, if regularity is lacking, it becomes more cumbersome to express large
numbers. For instance, it seems easier to compress the number ‘one billion,’
than the number ‘one billion seven hundred thirty-five million two hundred
sixty-eight thousand and three hundred ninety-four,’ even though they are of
the same order of magnitude.
The above example shows that we need too many bits to transmit regular
objects. The converse problem, too little bits, arises as well since Shannon’s
theory of information and communication deals with the specific technology
problem of data transmission. That is, with the information that needs to be
transmitted in order to select an object from a previously agreed upon set of
alternatives; agreed upon by both the sender and the receiver of the message.
If we have an ensemble consisting of the Odyssey and the sentence “let’s go
drink a beer” then we can transmit the Odyssey using only one bit. Yet Greeks
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feel that Homer’s book has more information contents. Our task is to widen
the limited set of alternatives until it is universal. We aim at a notion of
‘absolute’ information of individual objects, which is the information which by
itself describes the object completely.
Formulation of these considerations in an objective manner leads again to
the notion of shortest programs and Kolmogorov complexity.
2 Randomness as Unpredictability
What is the proper definition of a random sequence, the ‘lacuna in probability
theory’ we have identified above? Let us consider how mathematicians test ran-
domness of individual sequences. To measure randomness, criteria have been
developed which certify this quality. Yet, in recognition that they do not mea-
sure ‘true’ randomness, we call these criteria ‘pseudo’ randomness tests. For
instance, statistical survey of initial segments of the sequence of decimal dig-
its of π have failed to disclose any significant deviations of randomness. But
clearly, this sequence is so regular that it can be described by a simple program
to compute it, and this program can be expressed in a few bits.
“Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random
digits is, of course, in a state of sin. For, as has been pointed out
several times, there is no such thing as a random number—there are
only methods to produce random numbers, and a strict arithmetical
procedure is of course not such a method. (It is true that a problem
we suspect of being solvable by random methods may be solvable by
some rigorously defined sequence, but this is a deeper mathematical
question than we can go into now.)” [John Louis von Neumann
(1903—1957), Various techniques used in connection with random
digits, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Stand. Appl. Math. Series, 3(1951), pp.
36-38. Page 36. Also, Collected Works, Vol. 1, A.H. Taub, Ed.,
Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1963, pp. 768-770. Page 768.]
This fact prompts more sophisticated definitions of randomness. In his famous
address to the International Congress of Mathematicians in 1900, David Hilbert
(1862—1943) proposed twenty-three mathematical problems as a program to
direct the mathematical efforts in the twentieth century. The 6th problem asks
for ”To treat (in the same manner as geometry) by means of axioms, those
physical sciences in which mathematics plays an important part; in the first
rank are the theory of probability ..”. Thus, Hilbert views probability theory as
a physical applied theory. This raises the question about the properties one can
expect from typical outcomes of physical random sources, which a priori has
no relation whatsoever with an axiomatic mathematical theory of probabilities.
That is, a mathematical system has no direct relation with physical reality. To
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obtain a mathematical system that is an appropriate model of physical phe-
nomena one needs to identify and codify essential properties of the phenomena
under consideration by empirical observations.
Notably Richard von Mises (1883—1953) proposed notions that approach
the very essence of true randomness of physical phenomena. This is related
with the construction of a formal mathematical theory of probability, to form
a basis for real applications, in the early part of this century. While von Mises’
objective was to justify the applications to the real phenomena, Andrei Niko-
laevitch Kolmogorov’s (1903—1987) classic 1933 treatment constructs a purely
axiomatic theory of probability on the basis of set theoretic axioms.
“This theory was so successful, that the problem of finding the basis
of real applications of the results of the mathematical theory of prob-
ability became rather secondary to many investigators. ... [however]
the basis for the applicability of the results of the mathematical the-
ory of probability to real ‘random phenomena’ must depend in some
form on the frequency concept of probability, the unavoidable nature
of which has been established by von Mises in a spirited manner.”
[A.N. Kolmogorov, On tables of random numbers, Sankhya¯, Series
A, 25(1963), 369-376. Page 369.]
The point made is that the axioms of probability theory are designed so that
abstract probabilities can be computed, but nothing is said about what prob-
ability really means, or how the concept can be applied meaningfully to the
actual world. Von Mises analyzed this issue in detail, and suggested that a
proper definition of probability depends on obtaining a proper definition of a
random sequence. This makes him a ‘frequentist’—a supporter of the frequency
theory.
The following interpretation and formulation of this theory is due to John
Edensor Littlewood (1885—1977), The dilemma of probability theory, Little-
wood’s Miscellany, Revised Edition, B. Bolloba´s, Ed., Cambridge University
Press, 1986, pp. 71-73. The frequency theory to interpret probability says,
roughly, that if we perform an experiment many times, then the ratio of favor-
able outcomes to the total number n of experiments will, with certainty, tend
to a limit, p say, as n → ∞. This tells us something about the meaning of
probability, namely, the measure of the positive outcomes is p. But suppose
we throw a coin 1000 times and wish to know what to expect. Is 1000 enough
for convergence to happen? The statement above does not say. So we have to
add something about the rate of convergence. But we cannot assert a certainty
about a particular number of n throws, such as ‘the proportion of heads will
be p± ǫ for large enough n (with ǫ depending on n)’. We can at best say ‘the
proportion will lie between p ± ǫ with at least such and such probability (de-
pending on ǫ and n0) whenever n > n0’. But now we defined probability in an
obviously circular fashion.
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2.1 Von Mises’ Collectives
In 1919 von Mises proposed to eliminate the problem by simply dividing all infi-
nite sequences into special random sequences (called collectives), having relative
frequency limits, which are the proper subject of the calculus of probabilities
and other sequences. He postulates the existence of random sequences (thereby
circumventing circularity) as certified by abundant empirical evidence, in the
manner of physical laws and derives mathematical laws of probability as a con-
sequence. In his view a naturally occurring sequence can be nonrandom or
unlawful in the sense that it is not a proper collective.
Von Mises views the theory of probabilities insofar as they are nu-
merically representable as a physical theory of definitely observ-
able phenomena, repetitive or mass events, for instance, as found
in games of chance, population statistics, Brownian motion. ‘Prob-
ability’ is a primitive notion of the theory comparable to those of
‘energy’ or ‘mass’ in other physical theories.
Whereas energy or mass exist in fields or material objects, proba-
bilities exist only in the similarly mathematical idealization of collec-
tives (random sequences). All problems of the theory of probability
consist of deriving, according to certain rules, new collectives from
given ones and calculating the distributions of these new collectives.
The exact formulation of the properties of the collectives is secondary
and must be based on empirical evidence. These properties are the
existence of a limiting relative frequency and randomness.
The property of randomness is a generalization of the abundant
experience in gambling houses, namely, the impossibility of a suc-
cessful gambling system. Including this principle in the foundation
of probability, von Mises argues, we proceed in the same way as the
physicists did in the case of the energy principle. Here too, the ex-
perience of hunters of fortune is complemented by solid experience
of insurance companies and so forth.
A fundamentally different approach is to justify a posteriori the
application of a purely mathematically constructed theory of prob-
ability, such as the theory resulting from the Kolmogorov axioms.
Suppose, we can show that the appropriately defined random se-
quences form a set of measure one, and without exception satisfy
all laws of a given axiomatic theory of probability. Then it appears
practically justifiable to assume that as a result of an (infinite) ex-
periment only random sequences appear.
Von Mises’ notion of infinite random sequence of 0’s and 1’s (collective) essen-
tially appeals to the idea that no gambler, making a fixed number of wagers of
‘heads’, at fixed odds [say p versus 1− p] and in fixed amounts, on the flips of a
coin [with bias p versus 1− p], can have profit in the long run from betting ac-
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cording to a system instead of betting at random. Says Alonzo Church (1903—
): “this definition [below] ... while clear as to general intent, is too inexact in
form to serve satisfactorily as the basis of a mathematical theory.” [A. Church,
On the concept of a random sequence, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 46(1940), pp.
130-135. Page 130.]
Definition 1 An infinite sequence a1, a2, . . . of 0’s and 1’s is a random sequence
in the special meaning of collective if the following two conditions are satisfied.
1. Let fn is the number of 1’s among the first n terms of the sequence. Then
lim
n→∞
fn
n
= p,
for some p, 0 < p < 1.
2. A place-selection rule is a partial function φ, from the finite binary se-
quences to 0 and 1. It takes the values 0 and 1, for the purpose of select-
ing one after the other those indices n for which φ(a1a2 . . . an−1) = 1. We
require (1), with the same limit p, also for every infinite subsequence
an1an2 . . .
obtained from the sequence by some admissible place-selection rule. (We
have not yet formally stated which place-selection rules are admissible.)
The existence of a relative frequency limit is a strong assumption. Empiri-
cal evidence from long runs of dice throws, in gambling houses, or with death
statistics in insurance mathematics, suggests that the relative frequencies are
apparently convergent. But clearly, no empirical evidence can be given for the
existence of a definite limit for the relative frequency. However long the test
run, in practice it will always be finite, and whatever the apparent behavior in
the observed initial segment of the run, it is always possible that the relative
frequencies keep oscillating forever if we continue.
The second condition ensures that no strategy using an admissible place-
selection rule can select a subsequence which allows different odds for gambling
than a subsequence which is selected by flipping a fair coin. For example, let
a casino use a coin with probability p = 1/4 of coming up heads and pay-off
heads equal 4 times pay-off tails. This ‘Law of Excluded Gambling Strategy’
says that a gambler betting in fixed amounts cannot make more profit in the
long run betting according to a system than from betting at random.
“In everyday language we call random those phenomena where we
cannot find a regularity allowing us to predict precisely their re-
sults. Generally speaking, there is no ground to believe that ran-
dom phenomena should possess any definite probability. Therefore,
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we should distinguish between randomness proper (as absence of any
regularity) and stochastic randomness (which is the subject of prob-
ability theory). There emerges the problem of finding reasons for
the applicability of the mathematical theory of probability to the
real world.” [A.N. Kolmogorov, On logical foundations of probabil-
ity theory, Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics, Lecture
Notes in Mathematics, Vol. 1021, K. Itoˆ and J.V. Prokhorov, Eds.,
Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1983, pp. 1-5. Page 1.]
Intuitively, we can distinguish between sequences that are irregular and do not
satisfy the regularity implicit in stochastic randomness, and sequences that are
irregular but do satisfy the regularities associated with stochastic randomness.
Formally, we will distinguish the second type from the first type by whether or
not a certain complexity measure of the initial segments goes to a definite limit.
The complexity measure referred to is the length of the shortest description of
the prefix (in the precise sense of Kolmogorov complexity) divided by its length.
It will turn out that almost all infinite strings are irregular of the second type
and satisfy all regularities of stochastic randomness.
“In applying probability theory we do not confine ourselves to negat-
ing regularity, but from the hypothesis of randomness of the ob-
served phenomena we draw definite positive conclusions.” [A.N. Kol-
mogorov, Combinatorial foundations of information theory and the
calculus of probabilities, Russian Mathematical Surveys,, 38:4(1983),
pp. 29-40. Page 34.]
Considering the sequence as fair coin tosses with p = 1/2, the second condition
in Definition 1 says there is no strategy φ (principle of excluded gambling system)
which assures a player betting at fixed odds and in fixed amounts, on the tosses
of the coin, to make infinite gain. That is, no advantage is gained in the long
run by following some system, such as betting ‘head’ after each run of seven
consecutive tails, or (more plausibly) by placing the nth bet ‘head’ after the
appearance of n + 7 tails in succession. According to von Mises, the above
conditions are sufficiently familiar and a uncontroverted empirical generalization
to serve as the basis of an applicable calculus of probabilities.
Example 1 It turns out that the naive mathematical approach to a concrete
formulation, admitting simply all partial functions, comes to grief as follows.
Let a = a1a2 . . . be any collective. Define φ1 as φ1(a1 . . . ai−1) = 1 if ai = 1,
and undefined otherwise. But then p = 1. Defining φ0 by φ0(a1 . . . ai−1) = bi,
with bi the complement of ai, for all i, we obtain by the second condition of
Definition 1 that p = 0. Consequently, if we allow functions like φ1 and φ0 as
strategy, then von Mises’ definition cannot be satisfied at all. ✸
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2.2 Wald-Church Place Selection
In the thirties, Abraham Wald (1902—1950) proposed to restrict the a priori
admissible φ to any fixed countable set of functions. Then collectives do exist.
But which countable set? In 1940, Alonzo Church proposed to choose a set of
functions representing ‘computable’ strategies. According to Church’s Thesis,
this is precisely the set of recursive functions. With recursive φ, not only is
the definition completely rigorous, and random infinite sequences do exist, but
moreover they are abundant since the infinite random sequences with p = 1/2
form a set of measure one. From the existence of random sequences with proba-
bility 1/2, the existence of random sequences associated with other probabilities
can be derived. Let us call sequences satisfying Definition 1 with recursive φ
Mises-Wald-Church random. That is, the involved Mises-Wald-Church place-
selection rules consist of the partial recursive functions.
Appeal to a theorem by Wald yields as a corollary that the set of Mises-
Wald-Church random sequences associated with any fixed probability has the
cardinality of the continuum. Moreover, each Mises-Wald-Church random se-
quence qualifies as a normal number. (A number is normal in the sense of E´mile
Fe´lix E´douard Justin Borel (1871—1956) if each digit of the base, and each block
of digits of any length, occurs with equal asymptotic frequency.) Note however,
that not every normal number is Mises-Wald-Church random. This follows, for
instance, from Champernowne’s sequence (or number),
0.1234567891011121314151617181920 . . .
due to David G. Champernowne (1912— ), which is normal in the scale of 10
and where the ith digit is easily calculated from i. The definition of a Mises-
Wald-Church random sequence implies that its consecutive digits cannot be
effectively computed. Thus, an existence proof for Mises-Wald-Church random
sequences is necessarily nonconstructive.
Unfortunately, the von Mises-Wald-Church definition is not yet good enough,
as was shown by Jean Ville in 1939. There exist sequences that satisfy the Mises-
Wald-Church definition of randomness, with limiting relative frequency of ones
of 1/2, but nonetheless have the property that
fn
n
≥ 1
2
for all n.
The probability of such a sequence of outcomes in random flips of a fair coin is
zero. Intuition: if you bet ‘1’ all the time against such a sequence of outcomes,
then your accumulated gain is always positive! Similarly, other properties of
randomness in probability theory such as the Law of the Iterated Logarithm
do not follow from the Mises-Wald-Church definition. An extensive survey on
these issues (and parts of the sequel) is given in [8].
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3 Randomness as Incompressibility
Above it turned out that describing ‘randomness’ in terms of ‘unpredictability’ is
problematic and possibly unsatisfactory. Therefore, Kolmogorov tried another
approach. The antithesis of ‘randomness’ is ‘regularity’, and a finite string which
is regular can be described more shortly than giving it literally. Consequently, a
string which is ‘incompressible’ is ‘random’ in this sense. With respect to infinite
binary sequences it is seductive to call an infinite sequence ‘random’ if all of its
initial segments are ‘random’ in the above sense of being ‘incompressible’. Let
us see how this intuition can be made formal, and whether leads to a satisfactory
solution.
Intuitively, the amount of effectively usable information in a finite string is
the size (number of binary digits or bits) of the shortest program that, without
additional data, computes the string and terminates. A similar definition can
be given for infinite strings, but in this case the program produces element after
element forever. Thus, a long sequence of 1’s such as
10,000 times︷ ︸︸ ︷
11111 . . .1
contains little information because a program of size about log 10, 000 bits out-
puts it:
for i := 1 to 10, 000
print 1
Likewise, the transcendental number π = 3.1415 . . ., an infinite sequence of
seemingly ‘random’ decimal digits, contains but a few bits of information. (There
is a short program that produces the consecutive digits of π forever.) Such a
definition would appear to make the amount of information in a string (or other
object) depend on the particular programming language used.
Fortunately, it can be shown that all reasonable choices of programming
languages lead to quantification of the amount of ‘absolute’ information in indi-
vidual objects that is invariant up to an additive constant. We call this quantity
the ‘Kolmogorov complexity’ of the object. If an object is regular, then it has
a shorter description than itself. We call such an object ‘compressible’.
More precisely, suppose we want to describe a given object by a finite binary
string. We do not care whether the object has many descriptions; however, each
description should describe but one object. From among all descriptions of an
object we can take the length of the shortest description as a measure of the
object’s complexity. It is natural to call an object ‘simple’ if it has at least one
short description, and to call it ‘complex’ if all of its descriptions are long.
But now we are in danger of falling in the trap so eloquently described in the
Richard-Berry paradox, where we define a natural number as “the least natural
number that cannot be described in less than twenty words”. If this number
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does exist, we have just described it in thirteen words, contradicting its defini-
tional statement. If such a number does not exist, then all natural numbers can
be described in less than twenty words. (This paradox is described in [Bertrand
Russell (1872—1970) and Alfred North Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, Ox-
ford, 1917]. In a footnote they state that it “was suggested to us by Mr. G.G.
Berry of the Bodleian Library”.) We need to look very carefully at the notion
of ‘description’.
Assume that each description describes at most one object. That is, there is a
specification method D which associates at most one object x with a description
y. This means that D is a function from the set of descriptions, say Y , into the
set of objects, say X . It seems also reasonable to require that, for each object
x in X , there is a description y in Y such that D(y) = x. (Each object has a
description.) To make descriptions useful we like them to be finite. This means
that there are only countably many descriptions. Since there is a description
for each object, there are also only countably many describable objects. How
do we measure the complexity of descriptions?
Taking our cue from the theory of computation, we express descriptions as
finite sequences of 0’s and 1’s. In communication technology, if the specification
method D is known to both a sender and a receiver, then a message x can be
transmitted from sender to receiver by transmitting the sequence of 0’s and 1’s
of a description y with D(y) = x. The cost of this transmission is measured
by the number of occurrences of 0’s and 1’s in y, that is, by the length of y.
The least cost of transmission of x is given by the length of a shortest y such
that D(y) = x. We choose this least cost of transmission as the ‘descriptional’
complexity of x under specification method D.
Obviously, this descriptional complexity of x depends crucially on D. The
general principle involved is that the syntactic framework of the description
language determines the succinctness of description.
In order to objectively compare descriptional complexities of objects, to be
able to say “x is more complex than z”, the descriptional complexity of x should
depend on x alone. This complexity can be viewed as related to a universal
description method which is a priori assumed by all senders and receivers. This
complexity is optimal if no other description method assigns a lower complexity
to any object.
We are not really interested in optimality with respect to all description
methods. For specifications to be useful at all it is necessary that the mapping
from y to D(y) can be executed in an effective manner. That is, it can at least in
principle be performed by humans or machines. This notion has been formalized
as ‘partial recursive functions’. According to generally accepted mathematical
viewpoints it coincides with the intuitive notion of effective computation.
The set of partial recursive functions contains an optimal function which
minimizes description length of every other such function. We denote this func-
tion by D0. Namely, for any other recursive function D, for all objects x, there
is a description y of x under D0 which is shorter than any description z of x
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under D. (That is, shorter up to an additive constant which is independent of
x.) Complexity with respect to D0 minorizes the complexities with respect to
all partial recursive functions.
We identify the length of the description of x with respect to a fixed speci-
fication function D0 with the ‘algorithmic (descriptional or Kolmogorov) com-
plexity’ of x. The optimality ofD0 in the sense above means that the complexity
of an object x is invariant (up to an additive constant independent of x) under
transition from one optimal specification function to another. Its complexity
is an objective attribute of the described object alone: it is an intrinsic prop-
erty of that object, and it does not depend on the description formalism. This
complexity can be viewed as ‘absolute information content’: the amount of in-
formation which needs to be transmitted between all senders and receivers when
they communicate the message in absence of any other a priori knowledge which
restricts the domain of the message.
Broadly speaking, this means that all description syntaxes which are power-
ful enough to express the partial recursive functions are approximately equally
succinct. The remarkable usefulness and inherent rightness of the theory of Kol-
mogorov complexity stems from this independence of the description method.
Thus, we have outlined the program for a general theory of algorithmic com-
plexity. The four major innovations are as follows.
1. In restricting ourselves to formally effective descriptions our definition
covers every form of description that is intuitively acceptable as being
effective according to general viewpoints in mathematics and logics.
2. The restriction to effective descriptions entails that there is a universal
description method that minorizes the description length or complexity
with respect to any other effective description method. This would not
be the case if we considered, say, all noneffective description methods.
Significantly, this implies Item 3.
3. The description length or complexity of an object is an intrinsic attribute
of the object independent of the particular description method or formal-
izations thereof.
4. The disturbing Richard-Berry paradox above does not disappear, but
resurfaces in the form of an alternative approach to proving Kurt Go¨del’s
(1906—1978) famous result that not every true mathematical statement
is provable in mathematics.
3.1 Kolmogorov Complexity
To make this treatment precise and self-contained we briefly review notions and
properties needed in the sequel. We identify the natural numbers N and the
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finite binary sequences as
(0, ǫ), (1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 00), (4, 01), . . . ,
where ǫ is the empty sequence. The length l(x) of a natural number x is the
number of bits in the corresponding binary sequence. For instance, l(ǫ) = 0. If
A is a set, then |A| denotes the cardinality of A. In some cases we want to encode
x in self-delimiting form x′, in order to be able to decompose x′y into x and
y. Short codes are obtained by iterating the simple rule that a self-delimiting
(s.d.) description of the length of x followed by x itself is a s.d. description of
x. For example, both x′ = 1l(x)0x and x′′ = 1l(l(x))0l(x)x are s.d. descriptions
for x, and l(x′) ≤ 2l(x) + O(1) and l(x′′) ≤ l(x) + 2l(l(x)) + O(1). The string
x′′ self-delimits itself in a concatenation x′′y by the fact that an algorothm to
retrieve x works as follows. First count the number of ‘1’s with which x′′y starts
out until we find the first ‘0’.. This count is the length of the length of x, that
is, the length of l(x) which is l(l(x)). The binary substring of length l(l(x))
following the first ‘0′ is the binary representation of l(x). The next substring
of length l(x) following it is x itself. So we can retrieve x without having to
consider even one bit in the string after x. This is why the binary code x′′ for
x is called self-delimiting.
Let 〈.〉 : N × N → N denote a standard computable bijective ‘pairing’
function. Throughout this paper, we will assume that
〈x, y〉 := x′′y.
This way, the x′′ is has the length of x but for an additional logarithmic term.
Define 〈x, y, z〉 by 〈x, 〈y, z〉〉.
We need some notions from the theory of algorithms, see [15]. Let φ1, φ2, . . .
be a standard enumeration of the partial recursive functions. The (Kolmogorov)
complexity of x ∈ N , given y, is defined as
C(x|y) = min{l(〈n, z〉) : φn(〈y, z〉) = x}.
This means that C(x|y) is the minimal number of bits in a description from
which x can be effectively reconstructed, given y. The unconditional complexity
is defined as C(x) = C(x|ǫ).
An alternative definition is as follows. Let
Cψ(x|y) = min{l(z) : ψ(〈y, z〉) = x} (1)
be the conditional complexity of x given y with reference to decoding function
ψ. Then C(x|y) = Cψ(x|y) for a universal partial recursive function ψ that
satisfies ψ(〈y, n, z〉) = φn(〈y, z〉).
We will also make use of the prefix complexity K(x), which denotes the
shortest self-delimiting description. To this end, we consider so called prefix
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Turing machines, which have only 0’s and 1’s on their input tape, and thus
cannot detect the end of the input. Instead we define an input as that part of
the input tape which the machine has read when it halts. When x 6= y are two
such input, we clearly have that x cannot be a prefix of y, and hence the set of
inputs forms what is called a prefix code. We define K(x) similarly as above,
with reference to a universal prefix machine that first reads 1n0 from the input
tape and then simulates prefix machine n on the rest of the input.
A survey is [10]. We need the following properties. Throughout ‘log’ denotes
the binary logarithm. We often use O(f(n)) = −O(f(n)), so that O(f(n)) may
denote a negative quantity. For each x, y ∈ N we have
C(x|y) ≤ l(x) +O(1). (2)
For each y ∈ N there is an x ∈ N of length n such that C(x|y) ≥ n. In
particular, we can set y = ǫ. Such x’s may be called random, since they are
without regularities that can be used to compress the description. Intuitively,
the shortest effective description of x is x itself. In general, for each n and y,
there are at least 2n − 2n−c + 1 distinct x’s of length n with
C(x|y) ≥ n− c. (3)
In some cases we want to encode x in self-delimiting form x′, in order to
be able to decompose x′y into x and y. Good upper bounds on the prefix
complexity of x are obtained by iterating the simple rule that a self-delimiting
(s.d.) description of the length of x followed by x itself is a s.d. description of
x. Since x′ = 1l(x)0x and x′′ = 1l(l(x))0l(x)x are both s.d. descriptions for x,
and this shows that K(x) ≤ 2l(x) +O(1) and K(x) ≤ l(x) + 2l(l(x)) +O(1).
Similarly, we can encode x in a self-delimiting form of its shortest program
p(x) (l(p(x)) = C(x)) in 2C(x) + 1 bits. Iterating this scheme, we can encode
x as a selfdelimiting program of C(x) + 2 logC(x) + 1 bits, which shows that
K(x) ≤ C(x) + 2 logC(x) + 1, and so on.
If ω = ω1 . . . ωk . . . ωl . . . is a finite or infinite string then ωk:l denotes ωk . . . ωl,
a string of length l − k + 1.
3.2 Complexity Oscillations
Consider the question of how C behaves in terms of increasingly long initial
segments of a fixed infinite binary sequence (or string) ω. For instance, is it
monotone in the sense that C(ω1:m) ≤ C(ω1:n), or C(ω1:m|m) ≤ C(ω1:n|n), for
all infinite binary sequences ω and all m ≤ n? We can readily show that the
answer is negative in both cases. A similar effect arises when we try to use
Kolmogorov complexity to solve the problem of finding a proper definition of
random infinite sequences (collectives) according to the task already set by von
Mises in 1919, see Section 2.
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Kolmogorov’s intention was to call an infinite binary sequence ω ‘random’ if
there is a constant c such that, for all n, the n-length prefix ω1:n has C(ω1:n) ≥
n − c. However, such sequences do not exist. A simple argument shows that
that even for high-complexity sequences, with C(ω1:n) ≥ n− logn− 2 log logn
for all n, this results in so-called complexity oscillations, where
n− C(ω1:n)
logn
oscillates between 0 and about 1.
We show that the C complexity of prefixes of each infinite binary sequence
drops infinitely often unboundedly far below its own length. Let ω be any infinite
binary sequence, and ω1:m any m-length prefix of ω. If ω1:m is the nth binary
string in the lexicographical order 0, 1, 00, . . ., that is, n = ω1:m, m = l(n), then
C(ω1:n) = C(ωm+1:n) + c, with c a constant independent of n or m. Namely,
with O(1) additional bits of information, we can trivially reconstruct the nth
binary string ω1:m from the length n − l(n) of ωm+1:n. Then we find that
C(ωm+1:n) ≤ n − l(n) + c for some constant c independent of n, whence the
claimed result follows.
Our approach in this proof makes it easy to say something about the fre-
quency of these complexity oscillations. Define a ‘wave’ function w by w(1) = 2
and w(i) = 2w(i−1), then the above argument guarantees that there are at least
k values n1, n2, . . . , nk less than n = w(k) such that C(ω1:ni) ≤ ni − g(ni) + c
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Obviously, this can be improved.
The upper bound on the oscillations, C(ω1:n) = n+O(1), is reached infinitely
often for almost all high-complexity sequences. Furthermore, the oscillations of
all high-complexity sequences stay above n− logn−2 log logn, but dip infinitely
often below n− log n.
Due to the complexity oscillations the idea of identifying random infinite
sequences with those such that C(ω1:n) ≥ n− c, for all n, is trivially infeasible.
That is the bad news. In contrast, a similar approach in Section 4.3 for finite
binary sequences turned out to work just fine. Its justification was found in Per
Martin-Lo¨f’s (1942— ) important insight that to justify any proposed definition
of randomness one has to show that the sequences, which are random in the
stated sense, satisfy the several properties of stochasticity we know from the
theory of probability. Instead of proving each such property separately, one
may be able to show, once and for all, that the random sequences introduced
possess, in an appropriate sense, all possible properties of stochasticity.
In Section 4 we show how to define randomness of infinite sequences in
Martin-Lo¨f’s sense, which is a formal expression of the attribute of satisfying
all effectively testable laws of randomness—and hence satisfactorily resolves the
quest for a proper definition of random sequences. Without proof we state the
relation between Martin-Lo¨f randomness and high Kolmogorov complexity. Let
ω be an infinite binary sequence.
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(i) If there exists a constant c such that C(ω1:n) ≥ n− c, for infinitely many
n, then ω is random in the sense of Martin-Lo¨f with respect to the uniform
measure.
(ii) The set of ω, for which there exists a constant c and infinitely many n
such that C(ω1:n) ≥ n− c, has uniform measure one.
Hence, the set of random sequences not satisfying the condition (i) has uni-
form measure zero.
The idea that random infinite sequences are those sequences such that the
complexity of the initial n-length segments is at most a fixed additive constant
below n, for all n, is one of the first-rate ideas in the area of Kolmogorov
complexity. In fact, this was one of the motivations for Kolmogorov to invent
Kolmogorov complexity in the first place. We have seen in Section 4.4 that this
does not work for the plain Kolmogorov complexity C(·), due to the complexity
oscillations. The next result is important, and is a culmination of the theory.
For prefix complexity K(·) it is indeed the case that random sequences are those
sequences for which the complexity of each initial segment is at least its length.
The history of invention of Kolmogorov complexity is presented in
detail in [10]. Here it is important that A.N. Kolmogorov suggested
the above relation between the complexity of initial segments and
randomness of infinite sequences already in 1964 [see for example
A.N. Kolmogorov, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, IT-14:5(1968),
662-664]. Similar suggestions were explicitly or implicitly made in
some form by R. Solomonoff in 1960, [16], and Gregory J. Chaitin
(1947— ) in 1969, [1]. This approach being incorrect using C(·) com-
plexity, P. Martin-Lo¨f who visited Kolmogorov in Moscow in 1964
and 1965 already in 1965 [published in Inform. Contr., 9(1966), 602-
619] developed the theory as put forth in Section 4.4. Nevertheless,
Kolmogorov did not abandon the general outlines of his original idea
of connecting randomness of infinite sequences with complexity, see
pp. 405-406 of [Vladimir Andreevich Uspensky (1930— ), J. Symb.
Logic, 57:2(1992), 385-412].
Simultaneously and independently, Claus P. Schnorr [J. Com-
put. Syst. Sci., 7(1973), 376-388] for the uniform distribution, and
Leonid A. Levin (1948— ) [Sov. Math. Dokl., 14(1973), 1413-1416]
for arbitrary computable distributions, introduced unequal versions
of complexity (respectively, process complexity and the monotone
variant of complexity Km(x), in order to characterize randomness.
They gave the first executions of Kolmogorov’s idea by showing that
an infinite sequence ω is random iff |Km(ω1:n)− n| = O(1) (Levin)
and a similar statement for process complexity (Schnorr).
In 1974 L.A. Levin in [9], see also Pe´ter Ga´cs (1947— ) [3], and in-
dependently in 1975 G.J. Chaitin in [2], introduced the prefix version
of Kolmogorov complexity which we have denoted by K(·). Chaitin
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in his paper again proposed calling an infinite sequence ω random iff
K(ω1:n) ≥ n − O(1) for all n. Happily, this proposal characterizes
once more precisely those infinite binary sequences which are ran-
dom in Martin-Lo¨f’s sense (without proof attributed to C.P. Schnorr,
1974, in Chaitin’s paper). This important result was widely circu-
lated, but the first published proof appears, perhaps, as Corollary 3.2
in [Vladimir Vyacheslavovich V’yugin (1948— ), Semiotika i Infor-
matika, 16(1981), 14-43, in Russian]. See for historical notes [A.N.
Kolmogorov and V.A. Uspensky, SIAM J. Theory Probab. Appl.,
32(1987), 387-412].
Another equivalent proposal in terms of constructive measure
theory was given by Robert M. Solovay (1938— ). The fact that
such different effective formalizations of infinite random sequences
turn out to define the same mathematical object constitutes evidence
that our intuitive notion of infinite sequences which are effectively
random coincides with the precise notion of Martin-Lo¨f random in-
finite sequences.
3.3 Relation with Unpredictability
We recall von Mises’ classic approach to obtain infinite random sequences ω as
treated in Section 2, which formed a primary inspiration to the work reported
in this section. It is of great interest whether one can, in his type of formulation,
capture the intuitively and mathematically satisfying notion of infinite random
sequence in the sense of Martin-Lo¨f. According to von Mises an infinite binary
sequence ω was random (a collective) if:
1. ω has the property of frequency stability with limit p; that is, if fn =
ω1 + ω2 + · · ·+ ωn, then the limit of fn/n exists and equals p.
2. Any subsequence of ω chosen according to an admissible place-selection
rule has frequency stability with the same limit p as in condition 1.
One major problem was how to define ‘admissible’, and one choice was to
identify it with Church’s notion of selecting a subsequence ζ1ζ2 . . . of ω1ω2 . . .
by a partial recursive function φ by ζn = ωm if φ(ω1:r) = 0 precisely m − 1
times for r < m− 1 and φ(ω1:m−1) = 0. We called these φ ‘place-selection rules
according to Mises-Church,’ and the resulting sequences ζ, Mises-Wald-Church
random.
In Section 2 we stated that there are Mises-Wald-Church random sequences
with limiting frequency 1/2 which do not satisfy effectively testable proper-
ties of randomness like the Law of the Iterated Logarithm or the Recurrence
Property. (Such properties are by definition satisfied by sequences which are
Martin-Lo¨f random.) In fact, the distinction between the two is quite large,
since there are Mises-Wald-Church collectives ω with limiting frequency 1/2
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such that C(ω1:n) = O(f(n) logn) for every unbounded, nondecreasing, total
recursive function f . Such collectives are very nonrandom sequences from the
viewpoint of Martin-Lo¨f randomness where C(ω1:n) is required to be asymp-
totic to n. See Robert P. Daley (1944— ), Math. Syst. Theory, 9(1975), 83-94.
It is interesting to point out that although a Mises-Wald-Church random se-
quence may have very low Kolmogorov complexity, it in fact has very high
time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity. If we consider also sequences with lim-
iting frequencies different from 1/2, then it becomes even easier to find se-
quences which are random according to Mises-Wald-Church, but not according
to Martin-Lo¨f. Namely, any sequence ω with limiting relative frequency p has
complexity C(ω1:n) ≤ Hn + o(n) for H = −(p log p + (1 − p) log(1 − p)) (H
is Shannon’s entropy). This means that for each ǫ > 0 there are Mises-Wald-
Church random sequences ω with C(ω1:n) < ǫn for all but finitely many n.
On the other hand, clearly all Martin-Lo¨f random sequences are also Mises-
Wald-Church random (each admissible selection rule is an effective sequential
test).
3.4 Kolmogorov-Loveland Place Selection
This suggests that we have to liberate our notion of admissible selection rule
somewhat in order to capture the proper notion of an infinite random sequence
using von Mises’ approach. A proposal in this direction was given by A.N. Kol-
mogorov [Sankhya¯, Ser. A, 25(1963), 369-376] and Donald William Loveland
(1934— ) [Z. Math. Logik Grundl. Math. 12(1966), 279-294].
A Kolmogorov-Loveland admissible selection function to select an infinite
subsequence ζ1ζ2 . . . from ω = ω1ω2 . . . is any one-one recursive function φ :
{0, 1}∗ → N × {0, 1} from binary strings to (index, bit) pairs. The index gives
the next position in ω to be scanned, and the bit indicates if the scanned bit of
ω must be included in ζ1ζ2 . . .. More precisely,
φ(z) =
{
(i1, a1) if z = ǫ,
(im, am) if z = z1z2 . . . zm−1 with zj = ωij , 1 ≤ j < m.
The sequence ζ1ζ2 . . . is called a Kolmogorov-Loveland random sequence. Be-
cause φ is one-one, it must hold that im 6= i1, i2, . . . , im−1. The described pro-
cess yields a sequence of φ-values (z1, a1), (z2, a2), . . .. The selected subsequence
ζ1ζ2 . . . consists of the ordered sequence of those zi’s of which the associated
ai’s equal ones.
As compared to the Mises-Wald-Church approach, the liberation is con-
tained in the fact that the order of succession of the terms in the subsequence
chosen is not necessarily the same as that of the original sequence. In com-
parison, it is not obvious (and it seems to be unknown) whether a subsequence
ζ1ζ2 . . . selected from a Kolmogorov-Loveland random sequence ω1ω2 . . . by a
Kolmogorov-Loveland place-selection rule is itself a Kolmogorov-Loveland ran-
20
dom sequence. Note that the analogous property necessarily holds for Mises-
Wald-Church random sequences.
The set of Kolmogorov-Loveland random sequences is contained in the set
of Mises-Wald-Church random sequences and contains the set of Martin-Lo¨f
random sequences. If ω1ω2 . . . is Kolmogorov-Loveland random then clearly
ζ1ζ2 . . ., defined by ζi = ωσ(i) with σ being a recursive permutation, is also
Kolmogorov-Loveland random. The Mises-Wald-Church notion of randomness
does not have this important property of randomness of staying invariant under
recursive permutation. Loveland gave the required counterexample in the cited
reference. Hence, the containment of the set of Kolmogorov-Loveland random
sequences in the set of Mises-Wald-Church random sequences is proper.
This leaves the question of whether the containment of the set of Martin-
Lo¨f random sequences in the set of Kolmogorov-Loveland random sequences is
proper. Kolmogorov has suggested in [Problems Inform. Transmission, 5(1969),
3-4] without proof that there is a Kolmogorov-Loveland random sequences ω
such that C(ω1:n) = O(log n). But Andrei Albertovich Muchnik (1958— ) (not
to be confused with A.A. Muchnik) showed that this is false since no ω with
C(ω1:n) ≤ cn+O(1) for a constant c < 1 can be Kolmogorov-Loveland random.
Nonetheless, containment is proper since Alexander Khanevich Shen’ (1958— )
[Soviet Math. Dokl., 38:2(1989), 316-319] has shown there exists a Kolmogorov-
Loveland random sequence which is not random in Martin-Lo¨f’s sense. There-
fore, the problem of giving a satisfactory definition of infinite Martin-Lo¨f random
sequences in the form proposed by von Mises has not yet been solved. See also
[A.N. Kolmogorov and V.A. Uspensky, Theory Probab. Appl., 32(1987), 389-
412; V.A. Uspensky, Alexei Lvovich Semenov (1950— ) and A.Kh. Shen’, Russ.
Math. Surveys, 45:1(1990), 121-189].
4 Randomness as Membership of All Large Ma-
jorities
For a better understanding of the problem revealed by Ville, as in Section 2,
and its subsequent solution by P. Martin-Lo¨f in 1966, we look at some aspects
of the methodology of probability theory.
4.1 Typicality
Consider the sample space of all one-way infinite binary sequences generated
by fair coin tosses. Intuitively, we call a sequence ‘random’ iff it is ‘typical’. It
is not ‘typical’, say ‘special’, if it has a particular distinguishing property. An
example of such a property is that an infinite sequence contains only finitely
many ones. There are infinitely many such sequences. But the probability that
such a sequence occurs as the outcome of fair coin tosses is zero. ‘Typical’ infinite
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sequences will have the converse property, namely, they contain infinitely many
ones.
In fact, one would like to say that ‘typical’ infinite sequences will have all
converse properties of the properties which can be enjoyed by ‘special’ infinite
sequences. That is, such a sequence should belong to all large majorities. This
can be formalized as follows.
Suppose that a single particular property, such as containing infinitely many
occurrences of ones (or zeros), the Law of Large Numbers, or the Law of the
Iterated Logarithm, has been shown to have probability one, then one calls
this a Law of Randomness. Each sequence satisfying this property belongs to
a large majority, namely the set of all sequences satisfying the property which
has measure one by our assumption.
Now we call an infinite sequence is ‘typical’ or ‘random’ if it belongs to
all majorities of measure one, that is, it satisfies all Laws of Randomness. In
other words, each single individual ‘random’ infinite sequence posesses all prop-
erties which hold with probability one for the ensemble of all infinite sequences.
This is the substance of so-called pseudo-randomness tests. For example, to
test whether the sequence of digits corresponding to the decimal expansion of
π = 3.1415 . . . is random one tests whether the initial segment satisfies some
properties which hold with probability one for the ensemble of all sequences.
Example 2 One such property is ‘normality’ of a sequence as defined earlier.
Around 1909, Emile Borel called an infinite sequence of decimal digits normal in
the scale of ten if, for each k, the frequency of occurrences (possibly overlapping)
of each block y of length k ≥ 1 in the initial segment of length n goes to limit
10−k for n grows unbounded, [4]. It is known that normality is not sufficient
for randomness, since Champernowne’s sequence
123456789101112 . . .
is normal in the scale of ten. On the other hand, it is universally agreed that
a random infinite sequence must be normal. (If not, then some blocks occur
more frequent than others, which can be used to obtain better than fair odds
for prediction.)
For a particular binary sequence ω = ω1ω2 . . . let fn = ω1 + ω2 + · · · + ωn.
Of course, we cannot effectively test an infinite sequence. Therefore, a so-
called pseudo-randomness test examines increasingly long initial segments of
the individual sequence under consideration.
We can define a pseudo randomness test for the normality property with k =
1 to test a candidate infinite sequence for increasing n whether the deviations
from one half 0’s and 1’s become too large. For example, by checking for each
successive n whether
|fn − n
2
| > (1 + ǫ)
√
n log logn
2
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for a fixed constant ǫ > 0. (The Law of the Iterated Logarithm states that this
inequality should not hold for infinitely many n). If within n trials in this process
we find that the inequality holds k times, then we assume the original infinite
sequence to be random with confidence at most, say,
∑n
i=1 1/2
i −∑ki=1 1/2i.
(The sequence is random if the confidence is greater than zero for n goes to
infinity, and not random otherwise.)
Clearly, the number of pseudo-randomness tests we can devise is infinite.
Namely, just for the normality property alone there is a similar pseudo-randomness
test for each k ≥ 1. ✸
But now we are in trouble. The naive execution of the above ideas in classi-
cal mathematics is infeasible. Each individual infinite sequence induces its very
own pseudo-randomness test which tests whether a candidate infinite sequence
is in fact that individual sequence. Each infinite sequence forms a singleton
set in the sample space of all infinite sequences. All complements of singleton
sets in the sample space have probability one. The intersection of all comple-
ments of singleton sets is clearly empty. Therefore, the intersection of all sets
of probability one is empty. Thus, there are no random infinite sequences!
Let us give a concrete example. Consider as sample space S the set of all
one-way infinite binary sequences. The cylinder Γx = {ω : ω = x . . .} consists
of all infinite binary sequences starting with the finite binary sequence x. For
instance, Γǫ = S, where ǫ denotes the empty sequence, that is, the sequence
with zero elements. The uniform distribution λ on the sample space is defined
by λ(Γx) = 2
−l(x). That is, the probability of an infinite binary sequence ω
starting with a finite initial segment x is 2−l(x). In probability theory it is
general practice that if a certain property, such as the Law of Large Numbers,
or the Law of the Iterated Logarithm, has been shown to have probability one,
then one calls this a Law of Randomness. For example, in our sample space the
Law of Large Numbers says that limn→∞(ω1 + · · · + ωn)/n = 1/2. If A is the
set of elements of S which satisfy the Law of Large Numbers, then it can be
shown that λ(A) = 1.
Generalizing this idea for S with measure µ, one may identify any set B ⊆ S,
such that µ(B) = 1, with the Law of Randomness, namely, ‘to be an element of
B’. Elements of S which are do not satisfy the law ‘to be an element of B’ form
a set of measure zero, a null set. It is natural to call an element of the sample
space ‘random’ if it satisfies all laws of randomness. Now we are in trouble.
For each element ω ∈ S, the set Bω = S − {ω} forms a law of randomness.
But the intersection of all these sets Bω of probability one is empty. Thus, no
sequence would be random, if we require that all laws of randomness that ‘exist’
are satisfied by a random sequence.
23
4.2 Randomness in Martin-Lo¨f’s Sense
The Swedish mathematician Per Martin-Lo¨f, visiting Kolmogorov in Moscow
during 1964-1965, investigated the complexity oscillations of infinite sequences
and proposed a definition of infinite random sequences which is based on con-
structive measure theory using ideas related to Kolmogorov complexity, [Inform.
Contr., 9(1966), 602-619; Z. Wahrsch. Verw. Geb., 19(1971), 225-230]. This way
he succeeded in defining random infinite sequences in a manner which is free of
above difficulties.
It turns out that a constructive viewpoint enables us to carry out this pro-
gram mathematically without such pitfalls. In practice, all laws that are proved
in probability theory to hold with probability one are effective in the formal
sense of effective computability due to A.M. Turing. A straightforward formal-
ization of this viewpoint is to require a law of probability to be partial recursive
in the sense that we can effectively test whether it is violated. This suggests that
the set of random infinite sequences should not be defined as the intersection of
all sets of measure one, but as the intersection of all sets of measure one with
a recursively enumerable complement. The latter intersection is again a set of
measure one with a recursively enumerable complement. Hence, there is a single
effective law of randomness which can be stated as the property ‘to satisfy all
effective laws of randomness’, and the infinite sequences have this property with
probability one.
(There is a related development in set theory and recursion theory, namely,
the notion of ‘generic object’ in the context of ‘forcing’. For example, an equiva-
lent definition of genericity in arithmetic is being a member of the intersection of
all arithmetical sets of measure 1. There is a notion, called ‘1-genericity’, which
calls for the intersection of all recursively enumerable sets of measure 1. This
is obviously related to the approach of Martin-Lo¨f, and prior to it. Forcing was
introduced by Paul Cohen (1934— ) in 1963 to show the independence of the
continuum hypothesis, and using sets of positive measure as forcing conditions
is due to Robert M. Solovay soon afterwards.)
The natural formalization is to identify the effective test with a partial re-
cursive function. This suggests that one ought to consider not the intersection
of all sets of measure one, but only the intersection of all sets of measure one
with recursively enumerable complements. (Such a complement set is expressed
as the union of a recursively enumerable set of cylinders). It turns out that this
intersection has again measure one. Hence, almost all infinite sequences satisfy
all effective Laws of Randomness with probability one. This notion of infinite
random sequences turns out to be related to infinite sequences of which all finite
initial segments have high Kolmogorov complexity.
The notion of randomness satisfied by both the Mises-Wald-Church
collectives and the Martin-Lo¨f random infinite sequences is roughly
that effective tests cannot detect regularity. This does not mean that
a sequence may not exhibit regularities which cannot be effectively
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tested. Collectives generated by Nature, as postulated by von Mises,
may very well always satisfy stricter criteria of randomness. Why
should collectives generated by quantum mechanic phenomena care
about mathematical notions of computability? Again, satisfaction
of all effectively testable prerequisites for randomness is some form
of regularity. Maybe nature is more lawless than adhering strictly
to regularities imposed by the statistics of randomness.
Until now the discussion has centered on infinite random sequences where the
randomness is defined in terms of limits of relative frequencies. However,
“The frequency concept based on the notion of limiting frequency
as the number of trials increases to infinity, does not contribute
anything to substantiate the application of the results of probability
theory to real practical problems where we always have to deal with
a finite number of trials.” [A.N. Kolmogorov, On tables of random
numbers, Sankhya¯, Series A, 25(1963), 369-376. Page 369.]
The practical objection against both the relevance of considering infinite se-
quences of trials and the existence of a relative frequency limit is concisely
put in John Maynard Keynes’ (1883—1946) famous phrase “in the long run
we shall all be dead.” It seems more appealing to try to define randomness
for finite strings first, and only then define random infinite strings in terms of
randomness of initial segments.
The approach of von Mises to define randomness of infinite sequences in
terms of unpredictability of continuations of finite initial sequences under certain
laws (like recursive functions) did not lead to satisfying results. The Martin-
Lo¨f approach does lead to satisfying results, and is to a great extent equivalent
with the Kolmogorov complexity approach. Although certainly inspired by the
random sequence debate, the introduction of Kolmogorov complexity marks a
definite shift of point of departure. Namely, to define randomness of sequences
by the fact that no program from which an initial segment of the sequence can
be computed is significantly shorter than the initial segment itself, rather than
that no program can predict the next elements of the sequence. Thus, we change
the focus from the ‘unpredictability’ criterion to the ‘incompressibility’ criterion,
and since this will turn out to be equivalent with Martin-Lo¨f’s approach, the
‘incompressibility’ criterion is both necessary and sufficient.
4.3 Random Finite Sequences
Finite sequences which cannot be effectively described in a significant shorter
description than their literal representation are called random. Our aim is to
characterize random infinite sequences as sequences of which all initial finite
segments are random in this sense. Martin-Lo¨f’s related approach characterizes
random infinite sequences as sequences of which all initial finite segments pass
all effective randomness tests.
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Initially, before the idea of complexity, Kolmogorov proposed a close
analogy to von Mises’ notions in the finite domain. Consider a gen-
eralization of place-selection rules insofar as the selection of ai can
depend on aj with j > i [A.N. Kolmogorov, Sankhya¯, Series A,
25(1963), 369-376]. Let Φ be a finite set of such generalized place-
selection rules. Kolmogorov suggested that an arbitrary finite binary
sequence a of length n ≥ m can be called (m, ǫ)-random with respect
to Φ, if there exists some p such that the relative frequency of the
1’s in the subsequences ai1 . . . air with r ≥ m, selected by applying
some φ in Φ to a, all lie within ǫ of p. (We discard φ that yield sub-
sequences shorter than m.) Stated differently, the relative frequency
in this finite subsequence is approximately (to within ǫ) invariant
under any of the methods of subsequence selection that yield sub-
sequences of length at least m. Kolmogorov has shown that if the
cardinality of Φ satisfies:
d(Φ) ≤ 1
2
e2mǫ
2(1−ǫ),
then, for any p and any n ≥ m there is some sequence a of length n
which is (m, ǫ)-random with respect to Φ.
Let us borrow some ideas from statistics. We are given a certain sample space
S with an associated distribution P . Given an element x of the sample space,
we want to test the hypothesis ‘x is a typical outcome’. Practically speaking,
the property of being typical is the property of belonging to any reasonable
majority. In choosing an object at random, we have confidence that this object
will fall precisely in the intersection of all such majorities. The latter condition
we identify with x being random.
To ascertain whether a given element of the sample space belongs to a par-
ticular reasonable majority we introduce the notion of a test. Generally, a test
is given by a prescription which, for every level of significance ǫ, tells us for
what elements x of S the hypothesis ‘x belongs to majority M in S’ should be
rejected, where ǫ = 1 − P (M). Taking ǫ = 2−m, m = 1, 2, . . ., this amounts to
saying that we have a description of the set V ⊆ N ×S of nested critical regions
Vm = {x : (m,x) ∈ V }
Vm ⊇ Vm+1, m = 1, 2, . . . .
The condition that Vm be a critical region on the significance level ǫ = 2
−m
amounts to requiring, for all n∑
x
{P (x) : l(x) = n, x ∈ Vm} ≤ ǫ.
The complement of a critical region Vm is called the (1− ǫ) confidence interval.
If x ∈ Vm, then the hypothesis ‘x belongs to majority M ’, and therefore the
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stronger hypothesis ‘x is random’, is rejected with significance level ǫ. We can
say that x fails the test at the level of critical region Vm.
Example 3 A string x1x2 . . . xn with many initial zeros is not very random.
We can test this aspect as follows. The special test V has critical regions
V1, V2, . . .. Consider x = 0.x1x2 . . . xn as a rational number, and each critical
region as a half-open interval Vm = [0, 2
−m) in [0, 1), m = 1, 2, . . .. Then the
subsequent critical regions test the hypothesis ‘x is random’ by considering the
subsequent digits in the binary expansion of x. We reject the hypothesis on
the significance level ǫ = 2−m provided x1 = x2 = · · · = xm = 0, Another
test for randomness of finite binary strings rejects when the relative frequency
of ones differs too much from 1/2. This particular test can be implemented
by rejecting the hypothesis of randomness of x = x1x2 . . . xn at level ǫ = 2
−m
provided |2fn − n| > g(n,m), where fn =
∑n
i=1 xi, and g(n,m) is the least
number determined by the requirement that the number of binary strings x of
length n for which this inequality holds is at most 2n−m. ✸
In practice, statistical tests are effective prescriptions such that we can com-
pute, at each level of significance, for what strings the associated hypothesis
should be rejected. It would be hard to imagine what use it would be in statis-
tics to have tests that are not effective in the sense of computability theory.
Definition 2 Let P be a recursive probability distribution on the sample space
N . A total function δ : N → N is a P -test (Martin-Lo¨f test for randomness) if:
1. δ is enumerable (the set V = {(m,x) : δ(x) ≥ m} is recursively enumer-
able); and
2.
∑{P (x) : δ(x) ≥ m, l(x) = n} ≤ 2−m, for all n.
The critical regions associated with the common statistical tests are present
in the form of the sequence V1 ⊇ V2 ⊇ · · ·, where Vm = {x : δ(x) ≥ m}, for
m ≥ 1. Nesting is assured since δ(x) ≥ m+1 implies δ(x) ≥ m. Each set Vm is
recursively enumerable because of Item 1.
A particularly important case is P is the uniform distribution, defined by
L(x) = 2−2l(x). The restriction of L to strings of length n is defined by Ln(x) =
2−n for l(x) = n and 0 otherwise. (By definition, Ln(x) = L(x|l(x) = n).)
Then, Item 2 can be rewritten as
∑
x∈Vm
Ln(x) ≤ 2−m which is the same as
d({x : l(x) = n, x ∈ Vm}) ≤ 2n−m.
In this case we often speak simply of a test, with the uniform distribution L
understood.
In statistical tests membership of (m,x) in V can usually be deter-
mined in time polynomial in l(m) + l(x).
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Example 4 The previous test examples can be rephrased in terms of Martin-
Lo¨f tests. Let us try a more subtle example. A real number such that all bits in
odd positions in its binary representation are 1’s is not random with respect to
the uniform distribution. To show this we need a test which detects sequences
of the form x = 1x21x41x61x8 . . .. Define a test δ by
δ(x) = max{i : x1 = x3 = · · · = x2i−1 = 1},
and δ(x) = 0 if x1 = 0. For example: δ(01111) = 0; δ(10011) = 1; δ(11011) = 1;
δ(10100) = 2; δ(11111) = 3. To show that δ is a test we have to show that
δ satisfies the definition of a test. Clearly, δ is enumerable (even recursive).
If δ(x) ≥ m where l(x) = n ≥ 2m, then there are 2m−1 possibilities for the
(2m− 1)-length prefix of x, and 2n−(2m−1) possibilities for the remainder of x.
Therefore, d{x : δ(x) ≥ m, l(x) = n} ≤ 2n−m. ✸
Definition 3 A universal Martin-Lo¨f test for randomness with respect to dis-
tribution P , a universal P-test for short, is a test δ0(·|P ) such that for each
P -test δ, there is a constant c, such that for all x, we have δ0(x|P ) ≥ δ(x)− c.
We started out with the objective to establish in what sense incompressible
strings may be called random. Kolmogorov considered a notion of randomness
deficiency δ(x|A) = l(d(A))−C(x|A) of a string x relative to a finite set A. With
A the set of strings of length n and x ∈ A we find δ(x|A) = δ(x|n) = n−C(x|n).
Theorem 1 The function f(x) = n − C(x|n) − 1 is a universal L-test with L
the uniform distribution over {0, 1}∗ and n = l(x).
4.4 Random Infinite Sequences
Consider the question of how C behaves in terms of increasingly long initial
segments of a fixed infinite binary sequence (or string) ω. For instance, is it
monotone in the sense that C(ω1:m) ≤ C(ω1:n), or C(ω1:m|m) ≤ C(ω1:n|n), for
all infinite binary sequences ω and all m ≤ n? We have already seen that the
answer is negative in both cases. A similar effect arises when we try to use
Kolmogorov complexity to solve the problem of finding a proper definition of
random infinite sequences (collectives) according to the task already set by von
Mises in 1919, Section 2.
It is seductive to call an infinite binary sequence ω random if there is a
constant c such that, for all n, the n-length prefix ω1:n has C(ω1:n) ≥ n − c.
However, such sequences do not exist.
As in Section 4.3, we define a test for randomness. However, this time
the test will not be defined on the entire sequence (which is impossible for an
effective test and an infinite sequence), but for each finite binary string. The
value of the test for an infinite sequence is then defined as the maximum of
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the values of the test on all prefixes. Since this suggests an effective process of
sequential approximations, we call it a sequential test. Below, we need to use
notions of continuous sample spaces and measures.
Definition 4 Let µ be a recursive probability measure on the sample space
{0, 1}∞. A total function δ : {0, 1}∞ → N ∪{∞} is a sequential µ-test (sequen-
tial Martin-Lo¨f µ-test for randomness) if:
1. δ(ω) = supn∈N {γ(ω1:n)}, where γ : N → N is a total enumerable function
(V = {(m, y) : γ(y) ≥ m} is a recursively enumerable set); and
2. µ{ω : δ(ω) ≥ m} ≤ 2−m, for each m ≥ 0.
If µ is the uniform measure λ, then we often use simply sequential test.
We can require γ to be a recursive function without changing the
notion of a sequential µ-test. By definition, for each enumerable
function γ there exists a recursive function φ such that φ(x, k) non-
decreasing in k such that limk→∞ φ(x, k) = γ(x). Define a recur-
sive function γ′ by γ′(ω1:n) = φ(ω1:m, k) with 〈m, k〉 = n. Then,
supn∈N {γ′(ω1:n)} = supn∈N {γ(ω1:n)}.
Example 5 Consider {0, 1}∞ with the uniform measure λ(x) = 2−l(x). An
example of a sequential λ-test is to test whether there are 1’s in even positions
of ω ∈ {0, 1}∞. Let
γ(ω1:n) =
{
n if
∑n/2
i=1 ω2i = 0,
0 otherwise.
The number of x’s of length n such that γ(x) ≥ m is at most 2n/2 for any
m ≥ 1. Therefore, λ{ω : δ(ω) ≥ m} = 0 ≤ 2−m for m > 0. For m = 0,
λ{ω : δ(ω) ≥ m} ≤ 2−m holds trivially. A sequence ω is random with respect to
this test if δ(ω) <∞. Thus, a sequence ζ with 0’s in all even locations will have
δ(ζ) = ∞, and it will fail the test and hence ζ is not random with respect to
this test. Notice that this is not a very strong test of randomness. For example,
a sequence η = 010∞ will pass δ and be considered random with respect to this
test. This test only filters out some nonrandom sequences with all 0’s at the
even locations and cannot detect other kinds of regularities. ✸
We continue the general theory of sequential testing. If δ(ω) = ∞, then we
say that ω fails δ, or that δ rejects ω. Otherwise, ω passes δ. By definition, the
set of ω’s that is rejected by δ has µ-measure zero, and, conversely, the set of
ω’s that pass δ has µ-measure one.
Suppose for a test δ holds δ(ω) = m. Then there is a prefix y of ω, with
l(y) minimal, such that γ(y) = m for the γ used to define δ. Then, obviously,
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each infinite sequence ζ that starts with y has δ(ζ) ≥ m. The set of such ζ is
Γy = {ζ : ζ = yρ, ρ ∈ {0, 1}∞}, the cylinder generated by y. Geometrically
speaking, Γy can be viewed as the set of all real numbers 0.y . . . corresponding
to the half-open interval Iy = [0.y, 0.y + 2
−l(y)). (For the uniform measure,
λ(Γy) = 2
−l(y), the common length of Iy .)
In terms of common statistical tests, the critical regions are formed by the
nested sequence V1 ⊇ V2 ⊇ · · ·, where Vm is defined as Vm = {ω : δ(ω) ≥ m},
for m ≥ 1. We can formulate the definition of Vm as
Vm =
⋃
{Γy : (m, y) ∈ V }.
In geometric terms, Vm is the union of a set of subintervals of [0, 1). Since V is
recursively enumerable, so is the set of intervals whose union is Vm. For each
critical section we have µ(Vm) ≤ 2−m (in the measure we count overlapping
intervals only once).
Now we can reformulate the notion of passing a sequential test δ with asso-
ciated set V :
δ(ω) <∞ iff ω 6∈
∞⋂
m=1
Vm.
Definition 5 Let V be the set of all sequential µ-tests. An infinite binary
sequence ω, or the binary represented real number 0.ω, is called µ-random if it
passes all sequential µ-tests:
ω 6∈
⋃
V ∈V
∞⋂
m=1
Vm.
For each sequential µ-test V , we have µ(
⋂∞
m=1 Vm) = 0, by Definition 4.
We call
⋂∞
m=1 Vm a constructive µ-null set . Since there are only countably
infinitely many sequential µ-tests V , it follows from standard measure theory
that
µ
( ⋃
V ∈V
∞⋂
m=1
Vm
)
= 0,
and we call the set U =
⋃
V ∈V
⋂∞
m=1 Vm the maximal constructive µ-null set .
Similar to Section 4.3, we construct an enumerable function δ0(ω|µ), the
universal sequential µ-test which incorporates (majorizes) all sequential µ-tests
δ1, δ2, . . ., and that corresponds to U .
Definition 6 A universal sequential µ-test f is a sequential µ-test such that
for each sequential µ-test δi there is a constant c ≥ 0 and for all ω ∈ {0, 1}∞,
we have f(ω) ≥ δi(ω)− c.
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Theorem 2 There is a universal sequential µ-test (denoted as δ0(·|µ)).
Definition 7 Let the sample space {0, 1}∞ be distributed according to µ, and
let δ0(·|µ) be a universal sequential µ-test. An infinite binary sequence ω is
µ-random in the sense of Martin-Lo¨f, if δ0(ω|µ) <∞. We call such a sequence
simply random, where both µ and Martin-Lo¨f are understood. (This is partic-
ularly interesting for µ is the uniform measure.)
Note that this definition does not depend on the choice of the particular
universal sequential µ-test with respect to which the level is defined. Hence,
the line between random and nonrandom infinite sequences is drawn sharply
without dependence on a reference µ-test. It is easy to see that the set of infinite
sequences, which are not random in the sense of Martin-Lo¨f, forms precisely the
maximal constructive µ-null set of µ-measure zero we have constructed above.
Therefore,
Theorem 3 Let µ be a recursive measure. The set of µ-random infinite binary
sequences has µ-measure one.
We say that the universal sequential µ-test δ0(·|µ) rejects an infinite se-
quence with probability zero, and we conclude that a randomly selected infinite
sequence passes all effectively testable laws of randomness with probability one.
The main question remaining is the following. Let λ be the uniform
measure. Can we formulate a universal sequential λ-test in terms
of complexity? In Theorem 1 the universal (nonsequential) test is
expressed that way. The most obvious candidate for the universal
sequential test would be f(ω) = supn∈N {n − C(ω1:n)}, but it is
improper. To see this, it is simplest to notice that f(ω) would declare
all infinite ω to be nonrandom since f(ω) =∞, for all ω, because of
the complexity oscillations we have discussed above. The same would
be the case for f(ω) = supn∈N {n− C(ω1:n|n)}, by about the same
proof. It is difficult to express a universal sequential test precisely in
terms of C-complexity. Yet it is easy to separate the random infinite
sequences from the nonrandom ones in terms of ‘prefix’ complexity,
see below.
The idea that random infinite sequences are those sequences such that the com-
plexity of the initial n-length segments is at most a fixed additive constant below
n, for all n, is one of the first-rate ideas in the area of Kolmogorov complexity.
In fact, this was one of the motivations for Kolmogorov to invent Kolmogorov
complexity in the first place. We have seen in Section 4.4 that this does not
work for the plain Kolmogorov complexity C(·), due to the complexity oscilla-
tions. The next result is important, and is a culmination of the theory. For
prefix complexity K(·) it is indeed the case that random sequences are those
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sequences for which the complexity of each initial segment is at least its length.
Theorem 4 An infinite binary sequence ω is random with respect to the uni-
form measure iff there is a constant c such that K(ω1:n) ≥ n− c, for all n.
Although the following discussion is a bit beyond the scope of this article, it
is important to understand the raised issues. There are different ‘families’ of
tests which characterize precisely the same class of random infinite sequences.
The sequential tests are but one type. The test in Theorem 4 is an example
of an integral test (a universal one) with respect to the uniform measure as
defined. The introduction of different families of tests like martingale tests and
integral tests requires special machinery. It is of the utmost importance to
realize that an infinite sequence is random only in the sense of being random
with respect to a given distribution. For example, if we have the sample space
{0, 1}∞ and a probability measure µ such that Γx has µ-measure one for all
sequences x = 00 . . . 0 and measure zero for all Γy with y 6= 00 . . .0, then the
only µ-random infinite sequence is ω = 00 . . ..
Thus, in many applications we are not really interested in randomness with
respect to the uniform distribution, but in randomness with respect to a given
recursive distribution µ. It is therefore important to have explicit expressions
for µ-randomness. In particular, we have
Corollary 1 Let µ be a recursive measure. The function
ρ0(ω|µ) = sup
ω∈Γx
{−K(x|µ)− logµ(x)}
is a universal integral µ-test.
Example 6 With respect to the special case of the uniform distribution λ,
Theorem 4 sets ρ0(ω|λ) = supn∈N {n − K(ω1:n)} up to a constant additional
term. This is the expression we found already in Theorem 4. ✸
Such theories of exact expressions for tests which separate the random infi-
nite sequences from the nonrandom ones with respect to any recursive measure
are presented in [10], together with applications in inductive reasoning (the min-
imum description length inference in statistics) and physics and computation. In
the latter, one expresses a variation of coarse-grained Boltzmann entropy of an
individual micro state of the system in terms of a generalization of Kolmogorov
complexity called ‘algorithmic entropy’ rather than conventional coarse-grained
Boltzmann entropy in statistical mechanics which expresses the uncertainty of
the micro state when it is constrained only by the macro state comprising an
ensemble of micro states.
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Example 7 It is impossible to construct an infinite random sequence by al-
gorithmic means. But, using the reference prefix machine U , we can define a
particular random infinite binary sequence in a more or less natural way. The
halting probability is the real number Ω defined by
Ω =
∑
U(p)<∞
2−l(p),
the sum taken over all inputs p for which the reference machine U halts. Since
U halts for some p, we have Ω > 0. Because U is a prefix machine, the set of its
programs forms a prefix-code and by Kraft’s Inequality, see [10], we find Ω ≤ 1.
Actually, Ω < 1 since U does not always halt.
We call Ω the halting probability because it is the probability that U halts
if its program is provided by a sequence of fair coin flips. G.J. Chaitin observed
that the number Ω has interesting properties. In the first place, the binary
representation of the real number Ω encodes the halting problem very compactly.
Denote the initial n-length segment of Ω after the decimal dot by Ω1:n. If Ω
were a terminating binary rational number, then we use the representation with
infinitely many zeros, so that Ω < Ω1:n + 2
−n.
Claim 1 Let p be a binary string of length at most n. Given Ω1:n, it is decidable
whether the reference prefix machine U halts on input p.
Proof. Clearly,
Ω1:n ≤ Ω < Ω1:n + 2−n. (4)
Dovetail the computations of U on all inputs as follows. The first phase consists
of U executing one step of the computation on the first input. In the second
phase, U executes the second step of the computation on the first input and
the first step of the computation of the second input. Phase i consists of U
executing the jth step of the computation on the kth input, for all j and k such
that j + k = i. We start with an approximation Ω′ := 0. Execute phases 1,2,
. . . . Whenever any computation of U on some input p terminates, we improve
our approximation of Ω by executing
Ω′ := Ω′ + 2−l(p).
This process eventually yields an approximation Ω′ of Ω, such that Ω′ ≥ Ω1:n.
If p is not among the halted programs which contributed to Ω′, then p will
never halt. With a new p halting we add a contribution of 2−l(p) ≥ 2−n to the
approximation of Ω, contradicting Equation 4 by
Ω ≥ Ω′ + 2−l(p) ≥ Ω1:n + 2−n.
✷
It follows that the binary expansion of Ω is an incompressible sequence.
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Claim 2 There is a constant c such that K(Ω1:n) ≥ n− c for all n.
That is, Ω is a particular random real , and one that is naturally
defined to boot. That Ω is random implies that it is not computable,
and therefore transcendental. Namely, if it were computable, then
K(Ω1:n|n) = O(1), which contradicts Claim 2. By the way, irra-
tionality of Ω implies that both inequalities in Equation 4 are strict.
Proof. From Claim 1 it follows that, given Ω1:n, one can calculate all
programs p of length not greater than n for which the reference prefix machine
U halts. For each x which is not computed by any of these halting programs
the shortest program x∗ has size greater than n, that is, K(x) > n. Hence, we
can construct a recursive function φ computing such high complexity x’s from
initial segments of Ω, such that for all n,
K(φ(Ω1:n)) > n.
Given a description of φ in c bits, for each n we can compute φ(Ω1:n) from Ω1:n,
which means
K(Ω1:n) + c ≥ n,
which was what we had to prove. ✷
Corollary 2 By Theorem 4, we find that Ω is random with respect to the
uniform measure.
Knowing the first 10,000 bits of Ω enables us to solve the halting
of all programs of less than 10,000 bits. This includes programs
looking for counterexamples to Fermat’s Last Theorem (presumed
solved affirmatively at this time of writing), Goldbach’s Conjecture,
Riemann’s Hypothesis, and most other famous conjectures in mathe-
matics which can be refuted by single finite counterexamples. More-
over, for all axiomatic mathematical theories which can be expressed
compactly enough to be conceivably interesting to human beings, say
in less than 10,000 bits, Ω10,000 can be used to decide for every state-
ment in the theory whether it is true, false, or independent. Finally,
knowledge of Ω1:n suffices to determine whether K(x) ≤ n for each
finite binary string x. Thus, Ω is truly the number of Wisdom, and
‘can be known of, but not known, through human reason’ [Charles
H. Bennett and Martin Gardner, Scientific American, 241:11(1979),
20-34]. But even if you possess Ω1:10,000, you cannot use it except
by spending time of a thoroughly unrealistic nature. (The time t(n)
it takes to find all halting programs of length less than n from Ω1:n
grows faster than any recursive function.)
✸
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Example 8 Let us look at another example of an infinite random sequence, this
time defined in terms of Diophantine equations. These are algebraic equations
of the form X = 0, where X is build up from nonnegative integer variables
and nonnegative integer constants by a finite number of additions (A+B) and
multiplications (A × B). The best known examples are xn + yn = zn, where
n = 1, 2, . . ..
Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665) has stated that this equation has no
solution in integers x, y, and z for n an integer greater than 2. (For
n = 2 there exist solutions, for instance 32 + 42 = 52.) However,
he did not supply a proof of this assertion, often called Fermat’s
Last Theorem. After 350 years of withstanding concerted attacks
to come up with a proof or disproof, the problem had become a
celebrity among unsolved mathematical problems. (At this time of
writing, October 1995, there is a serious claim that the problem has
been settled.) Suppose we substitute all possible values for x, y, z
with x + y + z ≤ n, for n = 3, 4, . . . . This way, we recursively
enumerate all solutions of Fermat’s equation. Hence, such a process
will eventually give a counterexample to Fermat’s conjecture if one
exists, but the process will never yield conclusive evidence if the
conjecture happens to be true.
In his famous address to the International Mathematical Congress in 1900, D.
Hilbert proposed twenty-three mathematical problems as a program to direct
the mathematical efforts in the twentieth century. The tenth problem asks for an
algorithm which, given an arbitrary Diophantine equation, produces either an
integer solution for this equation or indicates that no such solution exists. After
a great deal of preliminary work by other mathematicians, the Russian math-
ematician Yuri V. Matijasevich finally showed that no such algorithm exists.
But suppose we weaken the problem as follows. First, effectively enumerate all
Diophantine equations, and consider the characteristic sequence ∆ = ∆1∆2 . . .,
defined by ∆i = 1 if the ith Diophantine equation is solvable, and 0 otherwise.
Obviously, C(∆1:n) ≤ n+O(1).
There is an algorithm to decide the solvability of the first n Diophantine
equations given about log n bits extra information. Namely, given the number
m ≤ n of soluble equations in the first n equations, we can recursively enumer-
ate solutions to the first n equations in the obvious way until we have found m
solvable equations. The remaining equations are unsolvable. (This is a partic-
ular case of a more general Lemma due to J.M. Barzdins known as Barzdins’
Lemma, [10].)
A.N. Kolmogorov observed that this shows that the solubility of the enumer-
ated Diophantine equations is interdependent in some way since C(∆1:n|n) ≤
logn + c, for some fixed constant c. The compressibility of the characteristic
sequence means in fact that the solvability of Diophantine equations is highly
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interdependent—it is impossible for an even moderately random sequence of
them to be solvable and the remainder unsolvable.
G.J. Chaitin proposed to replace the question of mere solubility by the ques-
tion of whether there are finitely many or infinitely many different solutions.
That is, no matter how many solutions we find for a given equation, by itself
this can give no information on the question to be decided. It turns out that the
set of indices of the Diophantine equations with infinitely many different solu-
tions is not recursively enumerable. In particular, in the characteristic sequence
each initial segment of length n has Kolmogorov complexity of about n.
Claim 3 There is an (exponential) Diophantine equation
A(n, x1, x2, . . . , xm) = 0
which has only finitely many solutions x1, x2, . . . , xm if the nth bit of Ω is zero
and which has infinitely many solutions x1, x2, . . . , xm if the nth bit of Ω is one.
The role of exponential Diophantine equations should be clarified.
Yu.V. Matijasevich [Soviet Math. Dokl., 11(1970), 354-357] proved
that every recursively enumerable set has a polynomial Diophan-
tine representation. J.P. Jones and Yu.V. Matijasevich [J. Symbol.
Logic, 49(1984), 818-829] proved that every recursively enumerable
set has a singlefold exponential Diophantine representation. It is
not known whether singlefold representation (which is important in
our application) is always possible without exponentiation. See also
G.J. Chaitin, Algorithmic Information Theory, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1987.
Proof. By dovetailing the running of all programs of the reference prefix
machine U in the obvious way, we find a recursive sequence of rational numbers
ω1 ≤ ω2 ≤ · · · such that Ω = limn→∞ ωn. The set
R = {(n, k) : the nth bit of ωk is a one}
is a recursively enumerable (even recursive) set. The main step is to use a
theorem due to J.P. Jones and Yu.V. Matijasevich [J. Symbol. Logic 49(1984),
818-829] to the effect that ‘every recursively enumerable set R has a single-
fold exponential Diophantine representation A(·, ·)’. That is, A(p, y) = 0 is
an exponential Diophantine equation, and the singlefoldedness consists in the
property that p ∈ R iff there is a y such that A(p, y) = 0 is satisfied, and,
moreover, there is only a single such y. (Here both p and y can be multituples
of integers, in our case p represents 〈n, x1〉, and y represents 〈x2, . . . , xm〉. For
technical reasons we consider as proper solutions only solutions x involving no
negative integers.) It follows that there is an exponential Diophantine equation
A(n, k, x2, . . . , xm) = 0 which has exactly one solution x2, . . . , xm if the nth
36
bit of the binary expansion of ωk is a one, and it has no solution x2, . . . , xm
otherwise. Consequently, the number of different m-tuples x1, x2, . . . , xm which
are solutions to A(n, x1, x2, . . . , xm) = 0 is infinite if the nth bit of the binary
expansion of Ω is a one, and this number is finite otherwise. ✷
✸
4.5 Randomness of Individual Sequences Resolved
The notion of randomness of an infinite sequence in the sense of Martin-Lo¨f,
as posessing all effectively testable properties of randomness (one of which is
unpredictability), has turned out to be identical with the notion of an infinite
sequence having the prefix Kolmogorov complexity of all finite initial segments
of at least the length of the initial segment itself, Theorem 4. This equivalence of
a single notion being defined by two completely different approaches is a truly
remarkable fact. (To be precise, the so-called prefix Kolmogorov complexity
of each initial segment of the infinite binary sequence must not decrease more
than a fixed constant, depending only on the infinite sequence, below the length
of that initial segment, [10].) This property sharply distinguishes the random
infinite binary sequences from the nonrandom ones. The set of random infinite
binary sequences has uniform measure one. That means that as the outcome
from independent flips of a fair coin they occur with probability one.
For finite binary sequences the distinction between randomness and non-
randomness cannot be abrupt, but must be a matter of degree. For example,
it would not be reasonable if one string is random but becomes nonrandom if
we flip the first nonzero bit. In this context too it has been shown that finite
binary sequences which are random in Martin-Lo¨f’s sense correspond to those
sequences which have Kolmogorov complexity at least their own length. Space
limitations forbid a complete treatment of these matters here. Fortunately, it
can be found elsewhere, [10].
5 Applications
5.1 Prediction
We are given an initial segment of an infinite sequence of zeros and ones. Our
task is to predict the next element in the sequence: zero or one? The set of
possible sequences we are dealing with constitutes the ‘sample space’; in this
case, the set of one-way infinite binary sequences. We assume some probability
distribution µ over the sample space, where µ(x) is the probability of the initial
segment of a sequence being x. Then the probability of the next bit being ‘0’,
after an initial segment x, is clearly µ(0|x) = µ(x0)/µ(x). This problem consti-
tutes, perhaps, the central task of inductive inference and artificial intelligence.
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However, the problem of induction is that in general we do not know the distri-
bution µ, preventing us from assessing the actual probability. Hence, we have
to use an estimate.
Now assume that µ is computable. (This is not very restrictive, since any
distribution used in statistics is computable, provided the parameters are com-
putable.) We can use Kolmogorov complexity to give a very good estimate of µ.
This involves the so-called ‘universal distribution’ M. Roughly speaking, M(x)
is close to 2−l, where l is the length in bits of the shortest effective description
of x. Among other things, M has the property that it assigns at least as high
a probability to x as any computable µ (up to a multiplicative constant factor
depending on µ but not on x). What is particularly important to prediction is
the following.
Let Sn denote the µ-expectation of the square of the error we make in esti-
mating the probability of the n-th symbol by M. Then it can be shown that the
sum
∑
n Sn is bounded by a constant. In other words, Sn converges to zero faster
than 1/n. Consequently, any actual (computable) distribution can be estimated
and predicted with great accuracy using only the single universal distribution.
This approach is due to Raymond J Solomonoff (1926— ), [16, 17, 18, 19] and
predates Kolmogorov’s complexity invention. This approach has led to several
developments in inductive reasoning, including the widely applied celebrated
‘minimum message length’ of Chris S. Wallace (1933— ) and ‘minimum de-
scription length (MDL)’ of Jorma Rissanen (1932— ), [Chris S. Wallace and
David M. Boulton, An information measure for classification, Computing Jour-
nal, 11(1968), 185-195; Jorma Rissanen, Modeling by the shortest data de-
scription, Automatica-J.IFAC, 14(1978), 465–471; Jorma Rissanen, Stochastical
Complexity and Statistical Inquiry, World Scientific Publishing Company, Sin-
gapore, 1989] model selection methods in statistics, by the analysis in [10].
5.2 Go¨del’s incompleteness result
We say that a formal system (definitions, axioms, rules of inference) is consistent
if no statement which can be expressed in the system can be proved to be both
true and false in the system. A formal system is sound if only true statements
can be proved to be true in the system. (Hence, a sound formal system is
consistent.)
Let x be a finite binary string. We write ‘x is random’ if the shortest binary
description of x with respect to the optimal specification method D0 has length
at least x. A simple counting argument shows that there are random x’s of each
length.
Fix any sound formal system F in which we can express statements like “x
is random”. Suppose F can be described in f bits—assume, for example, that
this is the number of bits used in the exhaustive description of F in the first
chapter of the textbook Foundations of F . We claim that, for all but finitely
many random strings x, the sentence ‘x is random’ is not provable in F . Assume
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the contrary. Then given F , we can start to exhaustively search for a proof that
some string of length n≫ f is random, and print it when we find such a string
x. This procedure to print x of length n uses only logn+ f bits of data, which
is much less than n. But x is random by the proof and the fact that F is sound.
Hence, F is not consistent, which is a contradiction. This type of argument is
due to Janis M. Barzdins (1937— ) and later G.J. Chaitin, see [10].
This shows that although most strings are random, it is impossible to ef-
fectively prove them random. In a way, this explains why the incompressibility
method is so successful. We can argue about a ‘typical’ individual element,
which is difficult or impossible by other methods.
5.3 Lower bounds
The secret of the successful use of descriptional complexity arguments as a
proof technique is due to a simple fact: the overwhelming majority of strings
have almost no computable regularities. We have called such a string ‘random’.
There is no shorter description of such a string than the literal description: it
is incompressible. Incompressibility is a noneffective property in the sense of
Example 5.2.
Traditional proofs often involve all instances of a problem in order to con-
clude that some property holds for at least one instance. The proof would have
proceeded simpler, if only that one instance could have been used in the first
place. Unfortunately, that instance is hard or impossible to find, and the proof
has to involve all the instances. In contrast, in a proof by the incompressibil-
ity method, we first choose a random (that is, incompressible) individual object
that is known to exist (even though we cannot construct it). Then we show that
if the assumed property would not hold, then this object could be compressed,
and hence it would not be random. Let us give a simple example appearing in
[11, 10]. A proof using the probabilistic method appears in [Paul Erdo¨s and Joel
Spencer, Probabilistic Methods in Combinatorics, Academic Press, New York,
1974].
A tournament is defined to be a complete directed graph. That is, for each
pair of nodes i and j, exactly one of edges (i, j) or (j, i) is in T . The nodes of a
tournament can be viewed as players in a game tournament. If (i, j) is in T , we
say player j dominates player i. We call T transitive if (i, j), (j, k) in T implies
(i, k) in T .
Let Γ = Γn be the set of all tournaments on N = {1, . . . , n}. Given a
tournament T ∈ Γ, fix a standard encoding E : T → {0, 1}n(n−1)/2, one bit for
each edge. The bit for edge (i, j) is set to 1 if i < j and 0 otherwise. There is a
1-1 correspondence between the members of Γ and the binary strings of length
n(n− 1)/2.
Let v(n) be the largest integer such that every tournament on N contains a
transitive subtournament on v(n) nodes.
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Theorem 5 v(n) ≤ 1 + ⌊2 logn⌋.
Proof. Fix T ∈ Γ such that
C(E(T )|n, p) ≥ n(n− 1)/2, (5)
where p is a fixed program that on input n and E′(T ) (below) outputs E(T ).
Let S be the transitive subtournament of T on v(n) nodes. We try to compress
E(T ), to an encoding E′(T ), as follows.
1. Prefix the list of nodes in S in order of dominance to E(T ), each node
using ⌈logn⌉ bits, adding v(n)⌈log n⌉ bits.
2. Delete all redundant bits from the E(T ) part, representing the edges be-
tween nodes in S, saving v(n)(v(n) − 1)/2 bits.
Then,
l(E′(T )) = l(E(T ))− v(n)
2
(v(n) − 1− 2⌈logn⌉). (6)
Given n, the program p reconstructs E(T ) from E′(T ). Therefore,
C(E(T )|n, p) ≤ l(E′(T )). (7)
Equations 5, 6, and 7 can only be satisfied with v(n) ≤ 1 + ⌊2 logn⌋. ✷ The
general idea used in the incompressibility proof of Theorem 5 is the following. If
each tournament contains a large transitive subtournament, or any other ‘regu-
lar’ property for that matter, then also a tournament T of maximal complexity
contains one. But the regularity induced by a too large transitive subtourna-
ment can be used to compress the description of T to below its complexity,
leading to the required contradiction.
Results using the incompressibility method can (perhaps) always be rewrit-
ten using the probabilistic method or counting arguments. The incompressibility
argument seems simpler and more intuitive. It is easy to generalize the above
arguments from proving ‘existence’ to proving ‘almost all’. Almost all strings
have high complexity. Therefore, almost all tournaments and almost all undi-
rected graphs have high complexity. Any combinatorial property proven about
an arbitrary complex object in such a class will hold for almost all objects in
the class. That is, such properties are subject to a Kolmogorov complexity
0—1 Law: they either hold by a Kolmogorov complexity argument for almost
all objects in the class or for no objects in the class. For example, the proof
of Theorem 5 can trivially be strengthened as below. By simply counting the
number of binary programs of length at most the righthand side of Equation 8,
there are at least 2n(n−1)/2(1 − 1/n) tournaments T on n nodes with
C(E(T )|n, p) ≥ n(n− 1)/2− log n. (8)
This is a (1− 1/n)th fraction of all tournaments on n nodes. Using Equation 8
in the proof yields the statement below.
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For almost all tournaments on n nodes (at least a (1− 1/n)th frac-
tion), the largest transitive subtournament has at most 1+2⌈2 logn⌉
nodes, from some n onwards.
In [10], Chapter 6, the incompressibility method is explained in more detail.
Its utility is demonstrated in a variety of examples of proving mathematical
and computational results. These include questions concerning the average case
analysis of algorithms (such as Heapsort), sequence analysis, average case com-
plexity in general, formal languages, combinatorics, time and space complexity
analysis of various sequential or parallel machine models, language recognition,
and string matching. Other applications include the use of resource-bounded
Kolmogorov complexity in the analysis of computational complexity classes, the
universal optimal search algorithm, and ‘logical depth’.
5.4 Statistical Properties of Finite Sequences
Each individual infinite sequence generated by a (12 ,
1
2 ) Bernoulli process (flip-
ping a fair coin) has (with probability 1) the property that the relative fre-
quency of zeros in an initial n-length segment goes to 12 for n goes to infinity.
Such randomness related statistical properties of individual (high) complexity
finite binary sequences are often required in applications of incompressibility
arguments. The situation for infinite random sequences is studied above.
We know from Section 4.4 that each infinite sequence which is random with
respect to the uniform measure satisfies all effectively testable properties of
randomness: it is normal, it satisfies the so-called Law of the Iterated Logarithm,
the number of 1’s minus the number of 0’s in an initial n-length segment is
positive for infinitely many n and negative for another infinitely many n, and so
on. While the statistical properties of infinite sequences are simple corollaries
of the theory of Martin-Lo¨f randomness, for finite sequences the situation is less
simple.
In the finite case, randomness is a matter of degree, because it would be
clearly unreasonable to say that a sequence x of length n is random and to say
that a sequence y obtained by flipping the first ‘1’ bit of x is nonrandom. What
we can do is to express the degree of incompressibility of a finite sequence in the
form of its Kolmogorov complexity, and then analyze the statistical properties
of the sequence—for example, the number of 0’s and 1’s in it, as in [10, 12].
Since almost all finite sequences have about maximal Kolmogorov complex-
ity, each statistical property which is possessed by each individual maximal
complexity sequence must also hold approximately in the expecteded sense (on
average) for the overall set. Let us look at the converse. The fact that some
property holds on the average over the members of a set does not in general
imply that they are present in most individual members. For example, if the
set is {00 . . .0, 11 . . .1} where both sequences have length m, then the average
relative frequency of 1’s over initial segments of length n is 1/2 for each n with
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1 ≤ n ≤ m. But for each individual member of this set the relative frequency
of 1’s in the initial segments is either zero or one.
In contrast, for infinite sequences all effectively testable properties of ran-
domness hold with probability one and therefore are also expected or average
properties. We have seen that these properties must also hold with certainty for
each individual sequence with high enough Kolmogorov complexity, and that
these sequences have probability one in the set of all sequences. That is, the
Kolmogorov random elements in given set with uniform probability distribution
possess individually each effectively testable property which is shared by almost
all elements of the set. We cannot expect that this phenomena also holds with
this sharpness in for the finite sequences, if only because we cannot devide the
set of finite sequences sharply into sequences which are random and sequences
which are not random (unlike the infinite sequences). However, it turns out
that randomness properties hold approximately for finite sequences with high
enough Kolmogorov complexity.
For example, we can a priori state that each high-complexity finite binary
sequence is ‘normal’ in the sense that each binary block of length k occurs
about equally frequent for k relatively small. In particular, this holds for k = 1.
However, in many applications we need to know exactly what ‘about’ and the
‘relatively small’ in this statement mean. In other words, we are interested in
the extent to which ‘Borel normality’ holds in relation with the complexity of a
finite sequence.
Let x have length n. It can be shown (and follows from the stronger result
below) that if C(x|n) = n+O(1), then the number of zeros it contains is
n
2
+O(
√
n).
Notation 1 The quantity K(x|y) in this section satisfies
C(x|y) ≤ K(x|y) ≤ C(x|y) + 2 logC(x|y) + 1.
This is the length of a self-delimiting version of a program p of length l(p) =
C(x|y), what we defined as ‘prefix complexity’.
Definition 8 The class of deficiency functions is the set of functions δ : N →
N satisfying K(n, δ(n)|n−δ(n)) ≤ c1 for all n. (Hence, C(n, δ(n)|n−δ(n)) ≤ c1
for all n.)
This way we can retrieve n and δ(n) from n − δ(n) by a self-delimiting
program of at most c1 bits. We choose c1 so large that each monotone sublinear
recursive function that we are interested in, such as logn,
√
n, log logn, is
such a deficiency function. The constant c1 is a benchmark which stays fixed
throughout this section.
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Lemma 1 There is a constant c, such that for all deficiency functions δ, for
each n and x ∈ {0, 1}n, if C(x) > n− δ(n), then∣∣∣#ones(x)− n
2
∣∣∣ <√(δ(n) + c)n ln 2. (9)
Proof. A general estimate of the tail probability of the binomial distribu-
tion, with sn the number of successful outcomes in n experiments with prob-
ability of success 0 < p < 1 and q = 1 − p, is given by Chernoff’s bounds,
[10]
Pr(|sn − np| ≥ m) ≤ 2e−m2/4npq. (10)
Let sn be the number of 1’s in the outcome of n fair coin flips, which means
that p = q = 1/2. Defining A = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : |#ones(x) − n/2| ≥ m} and
applying Equation 10,
d(A) ≤ 2n+1e−m2/n.
Let m =
√
(δ(n) + c)n ln 2 where c is a constant to be determined later. We
can compress any x ∈ A in the following way.
1. Let s be a self-delimiting program to retrieve n and δ(n) from n − δ(n),
of length at most c1.
2. Given n and δ(n), we can effectively enumerate A. Let i be the index of x
in such an effective enumeration of A. The length of the (not necessarily
self-delimiting) description of i satisfies
l(i) ≤ log d(A) = n+ 1 + log e−m2/n
≤ n+ 1− δ(n)− c.
The string si is padded to length n + 1 − δ(n) − c + c1. From si we can
reconstruct x by first using l(si) to compute n− δ(n), then compute n and δ(n)
from s and n− δ(n), and subsequently enumerate A to obtain the ith element.
Let T be the Turing machine embodying the procedure for reconstructing x.
Then, by definition of C(·),
C(x) ≤ CT (x) + cT ≤ n+ 1− δ(n)− c+ c1 + cT .
Choosing c = 1 + c1 + cT we find C(x) ≤ n − δ(n), which contradicts the
condition of the theorem. Hence, |#ones(x)− n/2| < m. ✷
It may be surprising at first glance, but there are no maximally complex
sequences with about equal number of zeros and ones. Equal numbers of zeros
and ones is a form of regularity, and therefore lack of complexity. That is,
for x ∈ {0, 1}n, if |#ones(x) − n/2| = O(1), then the randomness deficiency
δ(n) = n− C(x) is nonconstant (order logn).
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The analysis up till now has been about the statistics of 0’s and 1’s. But in a
normal infinite binary sequence according to Definition 8 each block of length k
occurs with limiting frequency of 2−k. That is, blocks 00, 01, 10, and 11 should
occur about equally often, and so on. Finite sequences will generally not be
exactly normal, but normality will be a matter of degree. We investigate the
block statistics for finite binary sequences.
Definition 9 Let x = x1 . . . xn be a binary string of length n, and y a much
smaller string of length l. Let p = 2−l and #y(x) be the number of (possibly
overlapping) distinct occurrences of y in x. For convenience, we assume that x
‘wraps around’ so that an occurrence of y starting at the end of x and continuing
at the start also counts.
Theorem 6 Assume the notation of Definition 9 with l ≤ log n. There is a
constant c, such that for all n and x ∈ {0, 1}n, if C(x) > n− δ(n), then
|#y(x) − np| < √αnp,
with α = [K(y|n) + log l + δ(n) + c](1 − p)l4 ln 2.
It is known from probability theory that in a randomly generated finite
sequence the expectation of the length of the longest run of zeros or ones is pretty
high. For each individual finite sequence with high Kolmogorov complexity we
are certain that it contains each block (say, a run of zeros) up to a certain length.
Theorem 7 Let x of length n satisfy C(x) ≥ n − δ(n). Then, for sufficiently
large n, x contains all blocks y of length
l = logn− log logn− log(δ(n) + logn)−O(1).
Corollary 3 If δ(n) = O(log n), then each block of length log n−2 log logn−
O(1) is contained in x.
Analyzing the proof of Theorem 7 we can improve this when K(y|n) is low.
Corollary 4 If δ(n) = O(log logn), then for each ǫ > 0 and n large enough,
x contains an all-zero run y (for which K(y|n) = O(log l)) of length l = logn−
(1 + ǫ) log logn + O(1). Since at least a fraction of 1 − 1/ logn of all strings
of length n has such a δ(n), the result gives the expected value of the length
of the longest all-zero run. This is almost a log logn additional term better
than the expectation reported using simple probabilistic methods in [Thomas
H. Cormen, Charles E. Leiserson, Ronald L. Rivest, Introduction to Algorithms,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990].
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5.5 Chaos and Predictability
Given sufficient information about a physical system, like the positions, masses
and velocities of all particles, and a sufficiently powerful computer with enough
memory and computation time, it should be possible in principle to compute all
of the past and all of the future of the system. This view, eloquently propagated
by P.S. Laplace, can be espoused both in classical mechanics and quantum me-
chanics. In classical mechanics one would talk about a single ‘history’, while in
quantum mechanics one would talk about probability distributions over an en-
semble of ‘possible histories.’ Nonetheless, in practice it is impossible to obtain
all parameters precisely. The finitary nature of measurement and computation
requires truncation of real valued parameters; there are measuring errors; and
according to basic quantum mechanics it is impossible to measure certain types
of parameters simultaneously and precisely. Altogether, it is fundamental that
there are minute uncertainties in our knowledge of any physical system at any
time.
This effect can been combined with the consistent tradition that small causes
can have large effects exemplified by the metaphor “a butterfly moving its wing
in tropical Africa can eventually cause a cyclone in the Caribbean.” Minute
perturbations in initial conditions can cause, mediated by strictly computable
functions, arbitrary large deviations in outcome. In the mathematics of non-
linear deterministic systems this phenomenon has been described by the catch
term ‘chaos’.
The unpredictability of this phenomenon is sometimes explained through
Kolmogorov complexity. Let us look at an example where unpredictability is
immediate (without using Kolmogorov complexity).
The following mathematical conditions are satisfied by classic thermody-
namic systems. Each point in a state space X describes a possible micro state
of the system. Starting from each position, the point representing the system
describes a trajectory in X . We take time to be discrete and let t range over
the integers.
If the evolution of the system in time can be described by a transformation
group U t of X such that U tω is the trajectory starting from some point ω at
time 0, then we call the system dynamical. Assume that U tω is computable as
a function of t and ω for both positive and negative t.
Definition 10 Assume that the involved measure µ is recursive and satisfies
µ(U tV ) = µ(V ) for all t and all measurable sets V (like the Γx’s), as in Liouville’s
Theorem. The µ-measure of a volume V of points in state space is invariant over
time. A physical system X consists of the space X , n-cells Γx, transformation
group U t, and the recursive and volume invariant measure µ.
Consider a system X with the orbit of the system the sequence of subsequent
micro states ω,Uω, U2ω, . . ..
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We cannot measure states which are (or involve) real numbers precisely. Be-
cause of the finite precision of our measuring instruments, the number of possible
observed states is finite. Hence, we can as well assume that the observable state
space S of our system contains only a finite number of states, and constitutes
a finite partition of X . Then, each micro state in X is observed as being an
element of some observable state in S.
For convenience we assume that S = {Γ0,Γ1} is the set of observed states.
Here Γ0 is the set of micro states starting with a ‘0’, and Γ1 is the set of micro
states starting with a ‘1’.
Let Γn be the observed state of X at time n. Given an initial observed
segment Γ0, . . . ,Γn−1 of an observed orbit we want to compute the next observ-
able state Γn. Even if it would not be possible to compute it, we would like to
compute a prediction of it which does better than a random coin flip.
A well-known example of a chaotic system is the the doubling map which
results from the so-called baker’s map by deleting all bits with non-positive
indexes from each state. That is, each micro state ω is a one-way infinite binary
sequence. Considering this as the binary expansion of a real number after the
binary point, the set of micro states is the real interval [0, 1). The system evolves
according to the transformation
ωn+1 = 2ωn (mod 1) (11)
where ‘mod 1’ means drop the integer part. All iterates of Equation 11 lie in
the unit interval [0, 1). The observable states are Γ0 = [0,
1
2 ) and Γ1 = [
1
2 , 1).
The doubling map is related to the discrete logistic equation
Yn+1 = αYn(1− Yn)
which maps the unit interval upon itself when 0 ≤ α ≤ 4. When
α = 4, setting Yn = sin 2πXn, we get precisely
Xn+1 = 2Xn (mod 1).
Assuming that the initial state is randomly drawn from [0, 1) according to the
uniform measure λ, we can use complexity arguments to show that the doubling
map’s observable orbit cannot be predicted better than a coin toss [Joseph Ford,
‘How random is a random coin toss?’, Physics Today, 36(1983), April issue, pp.
40-47].
Namely, with λ-probability 1 the drawn initial state will be a Martin-Lo¨f
random infinite sequence since we have shown that they have uniform measure
one in the set of infinite sequences. Such random sequences by definition cannot
be effectively predicted better than a random coin toss, [10].
But in this case we do not need to go to such trouble. The observed orbit
essentially consists of the consecutive bits of the initial state. Selecting that
initial state randomly from the uniform measure is isomorphic to flipping a fair
coin to generate it.
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